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Abstract
This thesis aims to design new long term investment structured products that can
be used by insurance companies to smooth investment returns for their customers.
These products are widely known as pension contracts as they are mainly used in the
accumulation part of a pension scheme. Two popular pension schemes in UK are the
Defined Benefit (DB) scheme and the Defined Contribution (DC) scheme. Recently,
with the transition from the DB scheme to the DC scheme, more individuals must
provide for their own retirement without the security of an employer-backed pension
promise. Thus, it is of importance to provide the customer with suitable long term
investment products. The thesis, consisting of three research papers, aims to show
how to design a new pension contract that best meet the demand from the customers.
In order to better understand the pension contracts, our first paper (Chapter 3) care-
fully examines a traditional with-profits contract in the market. This paper gives a
closed form solution for the pricing of this contract and shows that it is overvalued
to the customers because of its embedded guarantees. In addition, the smoothing
method of this contract exposes the insurer to a risk that cannot be hedged. More-
over, the inter-generation risk sharing has been studied for this contract.
The smoothing method, which is a typical feature of the with-profits products, is
examined in detail in the second paper (Chapter 4). This paper compares three com-
mon smoothing methods of with-profits contracts in UK and see how the smoothing
method performs. We not only compare the absolute terminal smoothed value,
but also take the interim utility, customers’ satisfaction within the investment hori-
zons, in to account. This has been done by using Multi-Cumulative Prospect the-
ory(MCPT).
The third paper (Chapter 5) propose a new pension contract with the features of
guarantees and bonuses. It has transparent structure and clear distribution rule.
Under Cumulative Prospect thoery (CPT), the new contract generates higher util-
ity than the contract introduced in Guille´n et al. (2006). The result provides the
evidence why the guarantees should be included in the pension contract. In addi-
tion, our result shows with the increase of policyholder’s investment horizons, the
proportion of risky asset in the underlying investment portfolio increases while the
proportion of risk free asset decreases. This result conforms to the traditional life
cycle pension investment advice.
Acknowledgements
I am indebted to my supervisor, Catherine Donnelly. It is her that helped me setting
up the whole project. Without her advice and comments, this thesis would not be
exist. She not only taught me how to become an independent researcher, but also
gave me priceless advice for the life. For me, as the Chinese proverb says, she is like
a Mom. I am so fortunate to be her student.
My gratitude extends to my second supervisor, Andrew Cairns and my industry
supervisor, Brian Murray for their patient explanations and valuable suggestions.
I also want to express my gratitude to the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries for
sponsoring me this PhD position.
I am very grateful to my parents. They are always support my decisions and en-
courage me to pursue my dreams. I would also like to thank my little son, Lewei.
It is him that gives me the endless happiness every day.
Most importantly, I want to thank my beloved wife, Dan. For supporting my study,
she quit her job and came to join me in the UK. It’s her that spent all her time and
effort to look after the family. Without her unselfish love and support, I could not
finish my PhD.
         
 
Research Thesis Submission 
Please note this form should be bound into the submitted thesis. 
 
 
Name: Zhaoxun Mei 
School: Mathematical and Computer science 
Version:  (i.e. First, 
Resubmission, Final) 
Final Degree Sought: PhD 
 
 
Declaration  
 
In accordance with the appropriate regulations I hereby submit my thesis and I declare that: 
   
1. The thesis embodies the results of my own work and has been composed by myself 
2. Where appropriate, I have made acknowledgement of the work of others 
3. The thesis is the correct version for submission and is the same version as any electronic versions submitted*.   
4. My thesis for the award referred to, deposited in the Heriot-Watt University Library, should be made available for 
loan or photocopying and be available via the Institutional Repository, subject to such conditions as the Librarian 
may require 
5. I understand that as a student of the University I am required to abide by the Regulations of the University and to 
conform to its discipline. 
6. I confirm that the thesis has been verified against plagiarism via an approved plagiarism detection application e.g. 
Turnitin. 
 
 
ONLY for submissions including published works 
Please note you are only required to complete the Inclusion of Published Works Form (page 2) if your thesis contains 
published works) 
 
7. Where the thesis contains published outputs under Regulation 6 (9.1.2) or Regulation 43 (9) these are accompanied 
by a critical review which accurately describes my contribution to the research and, for multi-author outputs, a 
signed declaration indicating the contribution of each author (complete) 
8. Inclusion of published outputs under Regulation 6 (9.1.2) or Regulation 43 (9) shall not constitute plagiarism.   
 
* Please note that it is the responsibility of the candidate to ensure that the correct version of the thesis is submitted. 
 
 
Signature of 
Candidate: 
 Date:  
 
 
Submission  
 
Submitted By (name in capitals):  
 
Signature of Individual Submitting:  
 
Date Submitted: 
 
 
 
 
For Completion in the Student Service Centre (SSC) 
 
Limited Access  Requested Yes  No  Approved Yes  No  
E-thesis Submitted (mandatory for final 
theses) 
 
Received in the SSC by (name in capitals):  Date:  
  
Contents
1 Motivation and introduction 1
2 Background of pension contracts design 4
2.1 An overview of pension contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.1 With-profits contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.1.1 Smoothing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1.1.2 Guarantee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1.1.3 Bonus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1.2 Without-profits contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1.3 Unit-linked contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 The pricing and risk management of pension products . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2.1 Fairness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2.2 Risk-neutral pricing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2.3 Typical structure of with-profits contracts . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2.3.1 Grosen and Jørgensen (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2.3.2 Bacinello (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2.3.3 Døskeland and Nordahl (2008b) . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2.4 Risk management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2.4.1 Estimating Greeks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2.4.2 Finite Difference Approximations . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2.4.3 Pathwise Derivative Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2.4.4 Likelihood ratio method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3 Utility theory and pension contract design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3.1 Expected utility theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
i
2.3.1.1 Merton’s solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.3.2 Cumulative prospect theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.3.3 The design of pension products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3 Return smoothing method in a Pension contract: risk emerges 42
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.2.1 Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.2.2 Market Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.3 Pricing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.3.1 Smoothing mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.3.2 Pricing of the contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.3.3 Numerical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.4 Beating the insurance company: Speculating entry . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.5 Making a fair contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.6 Intergenerational Risk sharing and return redistribution . . . . . . . . 62
3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4 A comparison of smoothing methods in with-profits products 67
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.2 Smoothing methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.2.1 Geometric average (GA) smoothing method . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.2.2 Weigthed sum (WS) smoothing method . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.2.3 Bandwidth (BW) smoothing method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.3 The fairness of the smoothing methods under geometric Brownian
motion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.3.1 Market Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.3.2 GA method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.3.3 WS method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.3.4 BW Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.4 Further analysis of the smoothing methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
ii
4.4.1 Trending Bivariate Ornstein-Uhlenbeck(OU) model . . . . . . 86
4.4.2 Smoothing effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.6 Appendix: the fairness of the GA smoothing method under auto-
regress AR(1) model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5 The design of pension contracts: on the perspective of customers 99
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.2 Product design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.2.1 Financial market model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.2.2 New contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.2.2.1 Structure of new contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.2.2.2 Terminal value of the customer account . . . . . . . 106
5.2.2.3 Fair pricing of the contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.2.2.4 Investment strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.2.3 GJN contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.2.4 DN contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.3 Comparison under CPT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.3.1 Cumulative Prospect Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.3.2 Analysis of products under CPT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
5.3.2.1 Holding exactly one asset or contract . . . . . . . . . 117
5.3.2.2 Holding a combination of the assets and contracts . . 118
5.3.3 Sensitivity analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.4 Robust testing of the CPT-based results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.5 Comparison under EUT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
5.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
6 Conclusion and Outlook 130
Bibliography 133
iii
List of Tables
2.1 Balance sheet at time t = 0. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.1 Present value of the contract for different adjusted guaranteed rate d.
d is defined as the sum of bonus rate and the guaranteed growth rate.
The other parameter values are r = 0.02, σ = 0.2, N = 25, P = 1,
δ = 0.8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.2 Present value of terminal payout for customers adopting different
strategies. The parameter values are r = 0.02, σ = 0.2, N = 25,
P = 1, d = 0 and δ = 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.3 Fair annual fees for different adjusted guaranteed rate d. d is defined
as the sum of bonus rate and the guaranteed growth rate. r = 0.02,
σ = 0.2, N = 25, P = 1, δ = 0.8. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.1 The effects of different smoothing windows on the expected terminal
value under the GA method. µ = 0.065, σ = 0.15, N = 20, P = 1. . . 78
4.2 Parameters for the processes of underlying fund price. . . . . . . . . . 87
4.3 Mean and variance of the terminal payout of a 20 years contract from
different smoothing methods. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.4 Combined utility of the terminal payout of a 20 years contract for
different smoothing methods. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
iv
5.1 Certainty equivalent value of CPT utility (CEV ), expected value (E) and
standard deviation (SD) of the terminal wealth by holding exactly one
of the new contract, the GJN contract, the DN contract, the risk-free
asset and the risky asset. The value in the bracket is the annualised
continuously-compounded return of the expected terminal wealth. The
CPT utility is calculated by equation (5.20) and equation (5.21). The pa-
rameters are g = g′′ = 0.02, rp = 0.04, P = 1, α = 0.13, T = 20, rf = 0.04,
µ = 0.065, σ = 0.15, ψ = 0.9, θ = 0.2, ϕ = 0.75 and β = 0.5. . . . . . . . 119
5.2 Proportion of the new contract, the GJN contract, the DN contract, risk-
free asset and the risky asset in the optimal portfolio under CPT . The
parameters are g = g′′ = 0.02, rp = 0.04, P = 1, α = 0.13, T = 20,
rf = 0.04, µ = 0.065, σ = 0.15, ψ = 0.9, θ = 0.2, ϕ = 0.75 and β = 0.5.
The CEV of CPT utility of this optimised portfolio is 2.9150. . . . . . . . 119
5.3 Certainty equivalent value of CPT utility (CEV ), expected value (E) and
standard deviation (SD) of the terminal wealth by holding exactly one
of the GJN contract, the new contract, the DN contract, the risk-free
asset and the risky asset. The value in the bracket is the annualised
continuously-compounded return of the expected terminal wealth. The
CPT utility is calculated by Equation (5.20) and Equation (5.22). The
parameters are g = g′′ = 0.02, rp = 0.04, P = 1, α = 0.13, T = 20,
rf = 0.04, µ = 0.065, σ = 0.15, ψ = 0.9, θ = 0.2, ϕ = 0.75, ν = 0.61 and
δ = 0.69. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5.4 Expected utility of the terminal wealth of holding the GJN contract, the
new contract, the DN contract, the risk-free asset and the risky asset
under the utility function defined by Equation (5.23). The parameters are
α = 0.13. T = 20, rf = 0.04, µ = 0.065, σ = 0.15, g = g
′′ = 0.02, rp = 0.04
and P = 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
v
List of Figures
2.1 Value function based on equation (2.98) where λ = 2.25 and α = β =
0.88. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.2 Weighting function based on equation (2.99) where γ = 0.61 and
δ = 0.69. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.3 Dynamic optimal portfolio for two assets under EUT. . . . . . . . . . 40
2.4 Dynamic optimal portfolio for two assets under CPT. . . . . . . . . . 41
3.1 Expected terminal payout over asset share against generations. µ =
0.08, r = 0.02, σ = 0.2, N = 25, P = 1, δ = 0.8. . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.2 Expected terminal guaranteed amount against generations. µ = 0.08,
r = 0.02, σ = 0.2, N = 25, P = 1, δ = 0.8. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.3 Expected bonus rate against years. µ = 0.08, r = 0.02, σ = 0.2,
N = 25, P = 1, δ = 0.8. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.1 Example path of smoothed fund value by using the bandwidth smooth-
ing method. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.2 Example of bandwidth smoothing method. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.3 The increase rate of the expected value of the smoothed fund using
GA method against the expected return of the actual fund value.
µ = 0.065, σ = 0.15, N = 20, P = 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.4 The smoothed fund value changes with actual fund value, when the
original fund value equals 100. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.5 The smoothed fund value changes with the original smoothed fund
value, when the actual fund value equals to 100. . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
vi
4.6 The histogram of the percentage gap based on the Monte Carlo sim-
ulation for a 1 year contract, under the BW method. The parameters
are µ = 0.065 and σ = 0.15. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.7 The difference between the expected value using BW smoothing method
and the unsmoothed value , E[ABWn ] − E[An]. The parameters are
µ = 0.065, σ = 0.15, N = 20, P = 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
5.1 Relationship between guarantee rate g and participation rate α. T =
20 years, rf = 0.04 and σ ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3}. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.2 The behaviour of account balance Dt, market value of customer ac-
count V D(t) and investment account At in bull market. α = 0.13.
T = 20 years, g = 0.02, rf = 0.04, µ = 0.065 and σ = 0.15. In the
simulation, there are 100 steps in each year. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.3 The behaviour of account balance Dt, market value of customer ac-
count V D(t) and investment account At in bear market. α = 0.13.
T = 20 years, g = 0.02, rf = 0.04 , µ = 0.065 and σ = 0.15. In the
simulation, there are 100 steps in each year. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.4 The mean of portfolio weight in risky asset. It is calculated by simu-
lating 100 paths. α = 0.13. T = 20 years, rf = 0.04, µ = 0.065 and
σ = 0.15. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.5 The composition of the optimal portfolio for different investment hori-
zons. The parameters are P = 1, rf = 0.04, µ = 0.065, σ = 0.15,
ϕ = 0.75 and β = 0.5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.6 The composition of the optimal portfolio for different investment hori-
zons. The parameters are P = 1, rf = 0.04, µ = 0.1, σ = 0.2,
ϕ = 0.75 and β = 0.5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.7 The CPT CEV for combinations of the DN contract and the risky
asset. The parameters are rf = 0.04, µ = 0.1, σ = 0.2. . . . . . . . . . 123
5.8 The composition of optimal portfolio for different terms using the
value function and weighting function defined in Tversky and Kah-
neman (1992). rf = 0.04, µ = 0.065 and σ = 0.15. . . . . . . . . . . . 125
vii
5.9 The composition of optimal portfolio for different terms using the
value function and weighting function defined in Tversky and Kah-
neman (1992). rf = 0.04, µ = 0.1 and σ = 0.2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
5.10 The composition of the optimal portfolio for different investment hori-
zons. The parameters are rf = 0.04, µ = 0.065, σ = 0.15 and β = 0.88.126
5.11 The composition of optimal portfolio for different terms using the
value function and weighting function defined in Tversky and Kah-
neman (1992). rf = 0.04, µ = 0.1 and σ = 0.2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
viii
Publications
This thesis is based on the joint work between the author, Zhaoxun Mei and his
supervisor, Catherine Donnelly. Chapter 5 is a published paper in ”Annals of Ac-
tuarial Science (2018): 1-22 ”.
ix
Chapter 1
Motivation and introduction
Saving and investment for retirement is an important issue in almost every country.
Samuelson (1958) proposed that people tend to consume less than they produce
during their working years so that they can consume something in retirement when
they produce nothing. In the real world, a pension contract is just one of the saving
products in which people invest when they are young for their life after retirement.
which plays an important role in individuals’ lifetime wealth portfolio.
As investment products, a large part of pension products are invested in the
stock market. The returns of these products are highly dependent on the per-
formance of the underlying assets. Hence, the payout of these contracts are very
volatile. They may enjoy high returns in some good years while making a great loss
in some bad years. In this sense, smoothed returns are beneficial to both customers
and pension companies. On one hand, smoothed returns are helpful for customers to
make their life investment plan. On the other hand, payoffs to customers are liabili-
ties for pension companies. Smoothed returns indicate less volatility of the insurers’
liabilities which help insurance companies to better estimate their liabilities.
With the transition from Defined Benefit pension schemes to Defined Contri-
bution pension schemes, more individuals must provide for their own retirement
without the protection of an employer-backed pension promise. In order to protect
the customers from adverse market performance, the research on designing innova-
tive pension products is of significance.
The purpose of this thesis is to design a long term structured investment prod-
1
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uct for insurance companies to provide the customer’s retirement with the financial
support. We present three chapters to complete this target. Specifically, we start
with reviewing existing pension contracts, especially, the with-profits contracts. A
detailed analysis of an existing with-profits contracts is given. In addition, we care-
fully study one important feature of with-profits contracts, the smoothing mecha-
nism. Lastly, we propose a new contract which provides the lump sum capital for a
customer’s retirement. In order to help the readers understand these three chapters,
we provide a brief introduction to the background of this topic at the beginning.
The thesis is organised as follows.
Chapter 2 gives the background material on the thesis. At first, we give a gen-
eral overview of pension products in the market. The second part of this chapter
is introducing how to price a pension contract and manage financial risk. In or-
der to design a pension contract which meets customers’ demand, the theoretical
background of designing long-term investment products is discussed in the last part.
In Chapter 3, we study an existing pension contract in detail. A closed form
solution to price this contract is provided. The result shows that this contract gives
a higher value to the customers than its worth owing to the embedded guarantees.
Because of a special return smoothing method used in this contract, the customers
are able to choose an advantageous start date for the contract and expose the insurer
to a non-hedgeable risk. The closed formula to price this speculating entry strategy
is also given in this chapter. Moreover, a study of inter-generational risk sharing is
given in this chapter as well.
Return smoothing method is a typical feature in traditional pension contracts
and is believed to be a virtue of them. Chapter 4 compares three smoothing methods
used in current with-profits contracts in terms of fairness and smoothing effects.
Both the analytical formulae and numerical methods are used to study how the
smoothing methods perform. We not only study the absolute terminal value of each
smoothing methods, but also focus on the interim utility of the customers within
the investment horizons. A behaviour economics model, Multi Cumulative Prospect
Theory (MCPT) is used to study the interim utility of each method.
2
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Chapter 5 proposes a new pension contract with the features of guarantees and
bonuses. It has a transparent structure and clear distribution rule. We compare this
new contract to an existing contract in the market by using a behavioural model,
Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT). The result shows that the new contract is
more attractive to a CPT-maximising customer. In addition, guarantees are proved
helpful to improve customers’ utility and thus it should be included in the pension
contract. Under CPT, we notice that the dynamic optimal investment strategy is
a lifestyle investment strategy. With the increase of the investment horizon, more
money should be invested in the risky asset. This conforms to traditional pension
investment advice.
3
Chapter 2
Background of pension contracts
design
2.1 An overview of pension contracts
For a typical individual, providing a retirement income consists of the accumulation
phase and the decumulation phase. The accumulation phase is the period that
people use a portion of their monthly salary to build up a pension pot. After
retirement, people start to withdraw money from the pension pot and this period
is called the decumulation phase. This thesis is more interested in the investment
element of a pension contract. Thus, we focus on the accumulation phase of a
pension scheme.
There are various types of life insurance products in the market. Based on
how to share investment risk and return, life insurance contracts can be generally
grouped into three types: with-profits contracts, without-profits contracts and unit-
linked contracts. In the rest of the section, an overview of typical pension contracts
in the accumulation phase is provided.
2.1.1 With-profits contract
With-profits contract, or participating policy in US, was historically a significant
part of the UK life insurance product, but recent years have faced challenges and
4
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changes to the business. With-profits business accounted for 42% of total new
business in 1985 (measured as Annual Premium Equivalent premium income), but
the share reduced to 5% in 20131.
The idea of with-profits business can be traced back to mid-eighteenth century.
It origins from James Dodson’s envision of mutual life assurer. Dodson (1756) sug-
gests there would be two classes of policies for a mutual life assurer: one would
underwrite the guarantees and participate in the profits and risks of the insurer
while the other only enjoy the fixed amount of assured without sharing life office’s
experience (profit or loss). The revolutionary idea was implemented by the Equi-
table Life after the death of Dodson. Since then, with-profit business becomes the
paradigm of the profession and prospered in the next 200 years.
With-profits contract generally consists of a term life insurance policy and a
savings vehicle, called an endowment policy. Term insurance provides a benefit if
the life insured dies within the term. The payoff of the endowment is a lump sum to
the policyholder who survives to a known date. This allows the customers to build up
funds for a specific purpose, like an income in retirement. To this extent, with-profits
contracts works the same as a without-profits contract. However, the significant
difference is with-profits contracts will give the policyholder with additional periodic
return distributions which are not decided at inception but are determined within
the term of the contract to show policyholder’s participation in life office’s profits.
There are two widely used return distributions strategies followed by the in-
surance companies, the UK style and the US style. The UK method is known as
uniform reversionary bonus method, which was first used by the Equitable Life in
the late 18th century. The reversionary bonus is generally expressed as proportion
of the sum assured and applied to all contracts in force. Once the bonus is declared,
it increases the amount of sum of assured and can never be taken away. The US dis-
tribution rule is called the contribution method which was first proposed by Homans
(1863) in his paper “On the equitable distribution of surplus”. Under the US style,
office’s profits are usually returned to the policyholders in the form of an annual
1Source: “The Management of With-Profits Funds in Run-off”, Working party report of Insti-
tute and faculty of Actuaries
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dividend. The dividend is calculated for each policy to be in proportion to their
contributions to the office’s surplus, i.e., the excess of his payment to the cost of
insurance. In contrast to UK’s distribution rule, the dividend can be cash payment,
deductions for the later premium, reinvested in the insurance or used to increase the
sum assured.
With-profits contracts falls into two main types, the conventional with-profits
contracts and the unitised with-profits contracts. Unitised with-profits contracts are
operated in a similar way to the conventional contracts except the policy value of
the unitised with-profits contracts is expressed by a number of units and its unit
value. The change of the value of unitised with-profits contracts can be implemented
either by fixing the unit value and changing the number of units to reflect the
change of the policy value or changing the unit value while fixing the number of
units. Unitised with-profits contract is more popular than conventional with-profits
products because it provides a more transparent structure and return distribution
rule.
As this chapter mainly studies the investment element of UK’s with-profits
products, the term life part of the contract is not considered. In this sense, a with-
profits contracts works as a pure investment product which provides a lump sum at
the maturity in return for the previous payment of premiums. It is a medium to
long-term investment vehicle, typically with 20 - 30 years investment horizons. The
premiums of the with-profits contracts are pooled by the insurer into a life fund or
their investment portfolio which allows the cost of managing with-profits policies and
meeting claims to be shared. To have a high overall return, a significant proportion of
the fund is invested in high risk assets, like equities and property. The payout to the
policyholder of a with-profits contract depends on the underlying performance of the
investment fund which may rise significantly in some good years and slump sharply
in bad years. In order to mitigate the effects of extreme short term price movements
of the investment fund, with-profits contract generally provides a smoothed return
which makes the policy value increase stably. In addition, the downside risk borne
by the policyholder is limited by the embedded guarantees. Specificaly, the aim of
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with-profits contracts is to protect the customers against the short term fluctuation
in investment returns and to provide a competitive long term rate of return, which
is achieved by the following important features of with-profits contracts.
2.1.1.1 Smoothing
The aim of smoothing is to remove short-term volatility from the customers’ payout
value. The short-term fluctuation is anticipated to cancel itself out over the long
term. The asset share of a policy is the underlying value of the investment, which is
the accumulation of the premium paid less the expenses at the realised return of the
underlying fund. The insurer holds back some profits in good years and covers the
amounts needed in bad years. On average, the policy payout of with-profits contracts
should equal the asset share. Smoothing is a good way to avoid the dramatic short
term price movement. However, it is not able to protect the policyholder from long
term market falls. When the value of asset share decreases, the value of the payout
falls as well.
2.1.1.2 Guarantee
In order to protect the policyholder from long term adverse price movements, the
insurer of with-profits contracts provides guarantees to the policyholder. The guar-
antees can be a guaranteed amount at the maturity date of the contract or an
annually guaranteed interest rate applied to the policy value. If the payout is less
than the guaranteed value, the guaranteed value is paid to the policyholder by the
insurer. Thus, guarantees are valuable when the underlying investment returns are
poor and volatile.
Because of the existence of guarantee, the value of the policy will be invariant
if the market falls even though the value of the backing assets will meet a reduction.
Policyholders can benefit from these guarantees by having a steady stream of income
regardless of how their invested assets perform. But on the other hand, guarantees
becomes a burden for the insurers. The cost of hedging rises in such a low interest
rate environment. In addition, the new regulation, Solvency II requires the insurance
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companies hold more capital for the guarantees they issue. Because the risk return
profile, insurance companies seldom provides the guarantees for free.
2.1.1.3 Bonus
Bonus is another valuable part of with-profits contracts. If the underlying fund
performs well, the insurer may increase the guarantees through the declaration of a
bonus. Once a bonus is added, it can never be taken away. The bonus is distributed
in the form of regular bonus, declared during the policy term or terminal bonus,
which is declared at the maturity date. Regular bonus is generally determined every
year based on the investment performance of the insurer. If the underlying assets
perform badly, the regular bonus can be zero, i.e. no bonus is declared. Terminal
bonus is declared at the maturity date to make sure the payout is fair to the pol-
icyholder. In UK, the bonus is generally declared as the form of rate of return of
the benefit or sum assured. Cash payments and a reduction in future premiums are
also possible forms of bonus in some other countries.
With-profits contracts used to be the most popular pension contract in UK’s
pension market. However, since the beginning of this century, a few insurance
companies, such as Equitable Life, Eagle Star, Royal and Sun Alliance failed to
meet their high value guarantees provided with the with-profits contracts. This can
be attributed to the decline of interest rates since 1990 and the poor performance of
stock market after the burst of the Dot-Com bubble. But more importantly, their
failure arose from the mis-pricing of the complex guarantees underlying the with-
profits contracts. The insurers neglected the risk that those guaranteed would bite.
Further more, for customers, these embedded guarantees and the profit distribution
rule are complex and difficult to understand. As (Guille´n et al., 2006) stated, with-
profits contracts received much criticism from the public because of its opaqueness
and complexity. All the above reasons make the with-profits contracts less attractive
and demanding. On the other hand, insurers have less motivation to provide with-
profits contracts to the customers. This is because cost of hedging seems high in a low
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interest environment. In addition, under the new regulation Solvency II, guarantees
embedded with-profits contracts subject to much higher capital requirements.
Even though with-profits contracts are becoming less popular, its merits and
the embedded actuarial thought are valuable in the design of innovative pension
products. As the terminal payout of the with profits contracts equals to the sum
of assured plus a participation in the profit of the insurance company, the risk of
with-profits contracts are shared by the customers and the insurer.
2.1.2 Without-profits contracts
Without-profits contract is similar to with-profits contract. The only difference is
that, for without-profits contract, the sum assured is fixed at the inception of the
contract and the customer has no participation in the profit of the insurer. Term
life insurance product is a common form of with-profits contracts. As the payout to
a customer is a guaranteed amount of money, the risks of without-profits contracts
are fully borne by the insurers.
2.1.3 Unit-linked contracts
Compared to with-profits contracts, policyholders’ premiums of unit-linked con-
tracts are invested into some investment funds. The policyholder buys units of the
investment fund with the premium. The value of the units is determined by the per-
formance of the underlying investment fund. The payout of a unit-linked contract
is easy to calculate and understand. As there are no guaranteed maturity benefits
and the value of the terminal payout only depends on the value and units allocated
to the contract, the investment risk is only assumed by the policyholders. In order
to protect the downside risk of the policyholders, some guarantees are provided as
a rider to the unit-linked contracts.
Goecke (2013) suggests there is a tendency that the market share of with-
profits contract is overtaken by the unit-linked contract. The transparency and
simple structure make unit-linked contracts the dominant player in UK and other
European pension markets.
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2.2 The pricing and risk management of pension
products
2.2.1 Fairness
Because of the embedded guarantees, the terminal payoff of the with-profits con-
tracts are heavily dependent on the realisation path of the underlying investment
performance. The fair price of with-profits are usually determined by risk-neutral
pricing which arises from the fundamental theory of asset pricing (FTAP). The
FTAP originated from Harrison and Kreps (1979) and Harrison and Pliska (1981,
1983), which established the mathematical theory for Black-Scholes-Merton formu-
lae in option pricing.
Fair pricing is one of the most important part in designing new pension and
insurance products. The concept of fairness can be traced back to Aristotles Nico-
machean Ethics which suggests that fairness means the equality and reciprocity
in exchange (see (Broadie and Rowe, 2002), Judson (1997) and Johnson (2015)).
Johnson (2015) further proposed that the ethical concept of reciprocity built the
foundation for FTAP. By assuming FTAP, the value of the payoff is fair to both the
insurers and the customers.
In some cases, true fairness is not likely to exist. When it comes to the fairness
in a pooled portfolio, Donnelly (2015) gives a definition of actuarial fairness which
is defined as the expected benefits equalling the contributions for each member.
Similarly, it is unlikely to have true fairness in the pricing of with-profits contracts
which include multiple generations. Milevsky and Salisbury (2016) suggest that the
closest concept of truly fairness is equitable which means the expected payout for
each generation is the same.
2.2.2 Risk-neutral pricing
Policyholders of pension contracts generally pay premiums to their accounts every
month. For with-profits and without-profits contracts, policyholders’ premiums are
pooled together in a pot and then invested by the insurance company. For unit-
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linked contracts, on the other hand, the policyholders tend to choose the underlying
investment funds themselves. As we stressed earlier, the term insurance feature of
the unit-linked contract is not considered here. In this sense, unit-linked contracts
look like a mutual fund.
The pension contracts are viewed as pure investment products in this chapter.
The pricing methodology is applied to make sure that the contracts are financially
fair to both the insurer and the customers. If we view the customers’ premiums as
an asset of an insurance company, the terminal payout to the policyholder at the
end of the contract is a liability of the insurer. The financial fairness for the insurer
is that the expected present value of the liability equals the expected present value
of the asset. For a policyholder, a financially fair contract means the present value
of what he or she will receive at the terminal date of the contract is equal to the
present value of the premiums. The financial fairness is based on the notion of no
arbitrage. That is to say the expectation is taken under a risk neutral measure Q.
Mathematically, a contract with single premium P and investment horizon T ∈ N+
in a constant interest rate world is said to be financially fair if
P = e−rTEQ[AT ], (2.1)
where AT is the terminal value of customer payout and the r is the constant discount
rate.
The aim of pricing is to find the expected present value of the terminal payout.
Ideally, a closed form solution is achieved. Then it will bring much convenience to
the pricing team. However, in most cases, a closed form formula for the pricing
function of pension contracts is not available, especially when mortality, lapse and
expenses are considered. In practice, numerical methods, especially Monte Carlo
simulation, are widely used in pricing pension contracts.
As a unit-linked contract is like a mutual fund, what the customer will receive
is the terminal value of the investment from the underlying investment fund. In the
next section, we discuss more about the pricing of with-profits contracts because of
its complexity. A few examples about with-profits contracts will be discussed.
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2.2.3 Typical structure of with-profits contracts
With-profits contracts typically have three features: smoothing, guarantees and
bonus. However, the calculation of the terminal value of each contract can be quite
different. To make this clear, in this part, we introduce some typical contracts
from the literature and show the payout of these contracts. For easy comparison,
all the contracts are assumed to be single premium and no lapse and expense are
considered. The terminal value of each contract depends on the performance of a
reference portfolio managed by the insurance company. The price process of this
reference portfolio is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion:
 X0 = x0dXt = µXtdt+ σXtdWt, (2.2)
where the expected rate growth rate µ, and volatility σ are strictly positive constants.
W is a Wiener process defined on the filtered probability space (Ω,F, (Ft)t≤0,P)
where (Ft) is the sigma algebra containing the historical information up to time t
of this process. The maturity of the contract is a positive integer T and t is within
the finite horizon [0, T ]. Then the annual return of the reference portfolio is
Rt =
Xt
Xt−1
− 1, for t = 1, 2, ..., T, (2.3)
so that {1 +Rt}t=1,2,...,T are independent and log-normally distributed random vari-
ables.
Using geometric Brownian motion to model asset price implies strong assump-
tions like a constant expected return and volatility as well as independent returns
in disjoint time intervals, which is not true in practice. However, for long invest-
ment horizons, the geometric Brownian motion is not a bad model for illustrating
the contract structure. The reason why we choose the geometric Brownian mo-
tion to represent the price process is because of its popularity in previous works.
Some examples include Grosen and Jørgensen (2000), Bacinello (2001) and Bacinello
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(2001). In the following, we summarise the pensions contracts introduced in their
paper below to give a broad idea of the structure of with-profits contracts and how
to determine their payoffs. The details of each contract are given as follows.
2.2.3.1 Grosen and Jørgensen (2000)
We first introduce the contract studied by Grosen and Jørgensen (2000). At each
time t ∈ 1, 2, ..., T , the value of the customer account At increases at the policy
interest rate rpt which is the sum of bonus rate r
b
t ≥ 0 and the constant guaranteed
rate of return g ≥ 0. That is
rpt = g + r
b
t , for t = 1, 2, ..., T. (2.4)
The guarantee rate of return is set by the insurance company. Then the value of
the customer account increases at least at the rate of g each year. Bonus rate is an
additional compensation to the guaranteed rate. The explicit formula of the bonus
rate is presented by the equation (2.5):
 r
b
t = max
[
0, α
(
Bt−1
At−1
− γ
)
− g
]
, for t = 1, 2, ..., T,
Bt = Xt − At, for t = 1, 2, ..., T,
(2.5)
where γ is a constant target for the ratio of the value of the bonus account to the
customer account (Bt
At
) and α is the participation ratio.
The above equation shows rb(t) has the form of a call option and the t th year
bonus rate rb(t) is determined at time t− 1. The value of customer account at the
end of each year is
 A0 = P,At = At−1 × (1 + rp) = A0∏tj=1 [1 + max(α(Bj−1Aj−1 − γ) , g)] , for t = 1, 2, ..., T.
(2.6)
Now the formula to calculate the terminal payout AT is derived.
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2.2.3.2 Bacinello (2001)
Bacinello (2001) introduce a contract whose customer account increases at the policy
rate of rpt every year. Mathematically,
rpt = max(αRt, g) = g + max(αRt − g, 0), t = 1, 2, ..., T, (2.7)
where α ∈ [0, 1] represents the constant participation ratio and Rt ∈ R is the random
annual return of the underlying asset in year t. The constant g ≥ 0 is the guaranteed
rate of return. Thus the value of customer account At in year t is:
At = At−1(1 + rp(t)) = A0
t∏
j=1
[1 + max(αRj, g)] , for t = 1, 2, ..., T, (2.8)
where A0 is the initial premium P . The terminal value in the customer account AT
is the payout.
2.2.3.3 Døskeland and Nordahl (2008b)
Døskeland and Nordahl (2008b) introduce a more complex contract by including
an insurer account Ct. Let At and Bt denote the customer account and the bonus
account, respectively, at time t. When t = 0, the balance sheet of the insurance
company is shown in Table 2.1. The parameter ψ is the capital structure parameter,
which determines how the risk and return are shared between the insurer and the
customers.
Assets Liabilities
X0 C0 = (1− ψ)X0
B0 = 0
A0 = ψX0 = P
Table 2.1: Balance sheet at time t = 0.
The mathematical evolution of the value of the customer account At, the bonus
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account Bt and the insurer account Ct for t = 1, 2, ..., T are given as
At =

Xt if Xt ≤ At−1eg
At−1eg, if At−1eg < Xt ≤ (At−1 + Ct−1)eg +Bt−1
At−1eg + ψη(1− b)
×(Xt − ((At−1 + Ct−1)eg +Bt−1)), if Xt > (At−1 + Ct−1)eg +Bt−1,
(2.9)
Bt =

0, if At ≤ L1
Xt − At−1eg − Ct−1, if L1 < Xt ≤ L2
Bt−1, if L3 < Xt ≤ L3
Bt−1 + ψηb(Xt − ((At−1 + Ct−1)eg +Bt−1)), if Xt > L4,
(2.10)
for
L1 = At−1eg + Ct−1, (2.11)
L2 = At−1eg + Ct−1 +Bt−1, (2.12)
L3 = (At−1 + Ct−1)eg +Bt−1, (2.13)
L4 = At−1eg + Ct−1eg +Bt−1 (2.14)
and
Ct = Xt − At −Bt, (2.15)
where ψ ∈ (0, 1) is the capital structure parameter, η is the customer share of the
profits and b is the proportion of declared bonuses credited to the bonus account.
In any year, if the event Xt < At−1eg happens, the company is said to be bankrupt.
Then the customer receives the amount AT = Xτe
r(T−τ) where τ is the random time
of default in [0, T ]. Otherwise, the terminal value AT is determined by Equation
(2.9).
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2.2.4 Risk management
2.2.4.1 Estimating Greeks
With-profits products generally include guarantees which can be very valuable. Es-
timating the risk of guarantees is of great importance to insurance and pensions
companies. Thus, risk management is also an important part of the design of pen-
sion contracts. In this section, we review some important methods used to measure
the risk of embedded guarantees.
Price sensitivities, commonly referred as the Greeks, are the derivatives of the
option price with respect to the parameters of the model. In other words, the Greeks
present the change of the option price with regard to the change of the parameters
of the option price. In the Black-Scholes model, the parameters of the option price
includes volatility, risk free rate, maturity, current underlying price and strike price.
The first derivative of option price with respect to the underlying price is called
Delta(∆). It gives the number of units of underlying asset to hold in the hedging
portfolio. The second derivative of option price with respect to the underlying
price is Gamma(Γ) which shows the optimal time interval to re-balance the hedging
portfolio.
The Greeks play an important role in risk management of financial derivatives.
The embedded guarantees are essentially some forms of options. How to efficiently
estimate Greeks is of great importance to life and pension companies. As most of
the exotic options do not have closed form formula, it is more difficult to calcu-
late their Greeks. In this section, we are following closely with Glasserman (2003)
in introducing three methods that estimate price sensitivities using Monte Carlo
methods.
2.2.4.2 Finite Difference Approximations
Finite difference approximation estimates the Greeks by approximating the continu-
ous time differential equation with discrete time difference equation. To be specific,
let θ ranging over an open interval in R denote a parameter of a model. For each
value of θ, we can use this model to generate a random variable Y (θ) which is within
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some interval of real line. In the context of option pricing, Y (θ) is the simulation
result of discounted payoff of a option. Then the price of the option α(θ) is given
as
α(θ) = E[Y (θ)]. (2.16)
If the parameter θ represents the current price of underlying asset, then α′(θ) is
the option’s Delta while α′′(θ) is the option’s Gamma. If θ denotes time to expira-
tion, then α′(θ) is the option’s Theta. We can simulate n independent replications
Y1(θ), ..., Yn(θ) and the average of all independent result is denoted as Y (θ). Let
 ∼ N(0, v2) represent the residual of observed sample mean of discounted payoff
from the theoretical value α(θ). That is to say
Y (θ) = α(θ) + . (2.17)
In order to estimate α′(θ), the forward difference estimator is often used because
it is simple and easy to implement. The forward difference estimator of α′(θ) is
presented as
∆ˆF =
Y (θ + h)− Y (θ)
h
, (2.18)
where h is a small real value larger than 0.
By Taylor’s expansion, assuming α is twice differentiable at θ, we can get
α(θ + h) = α(θ) + α′(θ)h+
1
2
α′′(θ)h2 + o(h2). (2.19)
From equation (2.17), (2.18) and (2.19), the bias of forward difference estimator is
Bias(∆ˆF ) = E[∆ˆF − α′(θ)] = 1
2
α′′(θ)h+ o(h). (2.20)
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It is clear from equation (2.20) that smaller value of h leads to less bias. On the
other hand, we know the variance of the estimator is
Var(∆ˆF ) = h
−2[Y (θ + h)− Y (θ)]. (2.21)
In this sense, smaller value of h leads to larger variance. Hence, how to decide the
value of h is a trade off between variance and the bias of the estimates. The Mean
Squared Error (MSE) is defined as
MSE(∆ˆF ) = Var(∆ˆF ) + Bias(∆ˆF )
2. (2.22)
Hence, minimising the mean square error could be a possible objective. Let θ1 =
θ0 + h , we have Y (θ0) = α(θ0) + 0 and Y (θ1) = α(θ0 + h) + 1 where 0, 1 are
residuals. Now we can rewrite equation (2.18) as:
∆ˆF =
α(θ0 + h) + 1 − α(θ0)− 0
h
= ∆ + bh+
1 − 0
h
, (2.23)
where ∆ is α′(θ0) and b is 12α
′′(θ0). Thus, the mean squared error is:
MSE(∆ˆF ) = E[∆ˆF −∆]2 = E
[(
bh+
1 − 0
h
)2]
. (2.24)
Let the correlation coefficient ρ of 1 and 0 is independent of h. By differentiating
equation (2.24) with respect to h and setting first derivative equal to 0, we find the
optimal value of h:
h∗ =
4
√
2v2(1− ρ)
b2
, (2.25)
which minimises the MSE. The second derivative of equation (2.24) is positive, which
supports the above result. Another popular estimator of the finite difference method
is the central difference estimator. It is preferred to the forward difference estima-
tor because the central difference estimator has less bias. The central difference
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estimator is given as
∆ˆC =
Y (θ + h)− Y (θ − h)
2h
. (2.26)
However, it requires one more simulation than forward difference estimator (one for
Y (θ+h), one for Y (θ) and one for Y (θ−h)), thus needing more computing resource.
2.2.4.3 Pathwise Derivative Estimates
Instead of simulating at multiple parameter values, pathwise derivative method es-
timates the derivatives directly. Hence, this method has increased computing speed
and requires less resource. Here we outline the pathwise derivative method.
We know that
α′(θ) =
d
dθ
EQ[Y (θ)]. (2.27)
One important assumption of pathwise derivative estimate method is the inter-
changeability of expectation and differentiation. That is to say
α′(θ) =
d
dθ
EQ[Y (θ)] = EQ[
d
dθ
Y (θ)], (2.28)
or
α′(θ) = lim
h→0
EQ
[
Y (θ + h)− Y (θ)
h
]
= EQ
[
lim
h→0
Y (θ + h)− Y (θ)
h
]
. (2.29)
(Glasserman, 2003, p.393) points that one necessary and sufficient condition for this
assumption is uniform integrability of Y (θ+h)−Y (θ)
h
. In other words, for any θ and h
there exists a random variable C such that
|Y (θ + h)− Y (θ)|
h
≤ C a.s. (2.30)
(Glasserman, 2003, p.396) also suggests that the pathwise derivative method typi-
cally produces consistent estimators if the payoff function is continuous but is usu-
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ally not applicable if the payoff function is discontinuous. (Glasserman, 2003, p.394)
points out that the payoffs of standard European options, Asian options and look
back option are all continuous.
An example of how pathwise derivative method work for European call option
is given below. It is known that the discounted payoff Y of a call option is given as
Y = e−rT max(ST −K, 0) (2.31)
with underlying price of
ST = S0e
(r− 1
2
σ2)T+σ
√
TZ , (2.32)
where Z is a standard normal random variable.
From equation(2.32), we know that
dST
dS0
=
ST
S0
. (2.33)
Equation (2.31) shows us
Y =

e−rT (ST −K), if ST > K;
0, if ST ≤ K.
So the derivative dY
dST
is given as
dY
dST
= e−rT1{ST>K}, (2.34)
where 1 is the zero-one indicator function.
Combining equation (2.33) and equation(2.34) gives the form of Delta:
∆ˆFD = E
Q[
dY
dS0
] = EQ[
dY
dST
dST
dS0
] = e−rTEQ[
ST
S0
1{ST≥K}]. (2.35)
Then it is easy to use the simulation result to calculate the Delta. One advantage
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of pathwise derivative estimate against finite difference approximation is that the
pathwise method provides unbiased estimates of derivatives. The other is that the
pathwise method requires less computing time since re-sampling is not necessary.
The reason is the output generated from the initial simulation includes considerable
information which could be used to estimate the price sensitivities directly.
2.2.4.4 Likelihood ratio method
As explained in the last section, the pathwise method requires that the payoff func-
tion is continuous. It is primarily this requirement that limits its scope and appli-
cation. Instead of differentiating the payoff function in respect of the parameter of
interest, the likelihood ratio method gives another approach by using the relation-
ship between the parameter of interest and probability density of the price of the
underlying asset. The discounted payoff Y can be written as a function of a random
vector X = (X1, ..., Xm) where Xi denotes the underlying asset price at time i. The
probability density function of X is denoted as gθ(X) where θ is a parameter of the
density function. Then the expected discounted payoff is given by
EQ[Y ] =
∫
Rm
f(x)gθ(x)dx. (2.36)
By assuming the interchangeability of differentiation and integration, we have
d
dθ
EQ[Y (θ)] =
∫
Rm
f(x)
d
dθ
gθ(x)dx =
∫
Rm
f(x)
dgθ(x)/dθ
gθ(x)
gθ(x)dx
=EQ
[
f(x)
d ln gθ(x)
dθ
]
. (2.37)
Now the likelihood ratio estimator of d
dθ
EQ[Y ] is given as:
f(x)
d ln gθ(x)
dθ
. (2.38)
An example of the calculation the delta of European call option using likelihood ratio
method is also given as follows. The payoff function of an European call option only
depends on the underlying asset price at time T which is the expiration date of the
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option. In order to conform previous notation, we use ST and S0 to denote the
underlying asset price at time T and time 0 respectively. The probability density of
ST is
gS0(x) =
1
xσ
√
T
φ(d(x)), x ≥ 0, (2.39)
where
φ(Z) =
1√
2pi
e−z
2/2, (2.40)
d(x) =
ln(x/S0)− (r − σ2/2)T
σ
√
T
(2.41)
and Z is a standard normal random variable. Thus, the expected discounted payoff
is
EQ[Y (θ)] =
∫ ∞
0
e−rT max(x−K, 0)g(x)dx (2.42)
and the estimator of ∆ is given as
∆ˆLR =
dEQ[Y (S0)]
dS0
= EQ
[
e−rT max(ST −K, 0)d ln gS0(ST )
dS0
]
= EQ
[
e−rT max(ST −K, 0) Z
S0σ
√
T
]
. (2.43)
In this section, we broadly introduce three widely used methods to calculate
the Greeks. Different methods have their own advantages. Finite difference method
is easy to understand. Pathwise derivative estimates is more accurate and efficient.
Likelihood ratio method provides relatively good estimation and requires less as-
sumptions. Which one to use in calculating the Greeks mainly depends on the
specific situation. In this thesis, finite difference method is used in Chapter 5 to
calculate the risky asset in the optimal portfolio.
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2.3 Utility theory and pension contract design
Nowadays, there are so many pension products in the market. In order to sell more
contracts to the market, from the perspective of a pension company, the question
of whether a new product will be popular is of significance. Whether the product
meets investors’ requirements is one question they need to answer. On the other
hand, for individuals, they are keen on which product is the best one for them in
terms of giving them the highest satisfaction or which one is the most aligned with
their preference. It is not always true to choose the product generating the highest
expected payoff. Buying a pension contract is not only able to generate a profit for
the customers but also possible for the customers to end up with a loss. This is
a typical problem of making decision under uncertainty. In order to answer these
questions, it is necessary to have a tool or standard which could tell if one product
is preferred to another one.
There is an elaborate theory, utility theory, which helps us to understand peo-
ple’s decisions under uncertainty. Utility is a psychological term to express how
people perceive goods or wealth. For example, if you prefer an apple to an orange,
then you give the apple a higher utility. In the rest of this chapter, we introduce two
widely used utility theories in the context of economics and finance. In addition, the
application of utility theory in the design process of pension contracts is discussed.
2.3.1 Expected utility theory
Expected Utility Theory (EUT) has been widely used to explain people’s choice
under uncertainty. In the eighteenth century, Daniel Bernoulli suggested using utility
function to solve the famous St. Petersburg paradox which is based on an interesting
game.
The game is to toss a fair coin until the first head appears. If you get a head in
the first toss, you will receive $2. If you get a tail on the first throw, you continue
to throw the coin until you get a head. You will receive $2n if the first head appears
at the nth coin toss. How much are you willing to pay to play this game?
Playing this game is like doing an investment or gamble. People need to make
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a decision (pay an amount of money) under uncertainty (without knowing the pay-
off). A common way to describe people’s investment behaviour is the mathematical
expectation. The expected payoff of one investment is the sum of the product of
the probability of the outcomes and their responding payoffs. If the discounted
expected terminal value is larger than the initial investment, then people should ac-
cept this investment. If not, then people should reject this investment. Expectation
maximisation is a widely accepted view before the proposal of EUT.
However, using expected value of payoff violates reality. This is because the
expected payoff of this game is infinite: if X is the payoff, then
E(X) =
1
2
× 2 + 1
22
× 22 + ...+ 1
2n
× 2n + ... =
∞∑
n=1
1 =∞. (2.44)
This result means no matter how much the game costs, the player is still willing
to play. However, this is inconsistent with the practice. For example, it is hard to
imagine one would spend 1 million pounds to play such a game.
Daniel Bernoulli believed that people might maximise the expected utility of an
investment when they make decisions. Specifically, people’s view of uncertain events
can be modelled as a utility function which is a concave function. In this sense, the
value of St. Petersburg paradox becomes finite. For instance, if the utility function
is assumed to be log2 (X) where X is the random payoff, then
E(x) =
1
2
× log2 (2) +
1
22
× log2 (22) + ...+
1
2n
× log2 (2n) + ... = 2. (2.45)
Based on Bernoulli’s work, Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) give four axioms
that support Expected Utility Theory. Before introducing the axioms, some nota-
tions which will be used later are given here. Let U(x) denote the utility function of
wealth x which represents the happiness or satisfaction that and amount of money
x could bring to someone. % represents “is preferred to”,  means “is strictly pre-
ferred to”,∼ shows “indifferent to”. First, four axioms under which expected utility
holds are presented.
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1. Completeness. For any gamble A and B, we have either A ≺ B, A  B or
A v B.
2. Transitivity. If gamble A % B and B % C, then A % C.
3. Continuity. If A % B and B % C, then there exist a p ∈ [0, 1] so that
B ∼ pA+ (1− p)C.
4. Independence. For any p ∈ (0, 1], if A % B, then pA+ (1− p)C % pB + (1− p)C
always holds.
A gamble consists of a series of possible mutually exclusive outcomes x1, x2, x3, ..., xn
with corresponding probabilities p1, p2, p3, ..., pn. Expected utility theory states if an
individual’s preferences satisfy the above four axioms, then there exists a function
to assign to each outcome xi a real number U(xi) such that for any gamble A and
B:
A  B iff E[U(A)] > E[U(B)], (2.46)
where E[U(x1, p1;x2, p2;x3, p3; ...xn, pn)] = p1U(x1) + p2U(x2) + p3U(x3) + ... +
pnU(xn). In other words, the value of one gamble equals the utility of each out-
come of the gamble multiplied by the corresponding probability.
In the following, we introduce two characteristics of EUT and present one widely
used family of EUT functions.
• Non-satiation
For rational investors, they always prefer more money to less money. This is
called non-satiation in utility theory and it can be expressed as:
if x1 > x2, then U(x1) > U(x2). (2.47)
In other words, U(x) is an increasing function, that is U ′(x) > 0.
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• Risk aversion
Another property of utility function is risk aversion. People tend to favor an
investment with certain payoff rather than another investment with the same
but uncertain expected payoff.
U(
x1 + x2
2
) >
1
2
U(x1) +
1
2
U(x2). (2.48)
That is to say U ′′(x) < 0, which means utility functions are concave under
EUT.
Hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) utility functions constitute an im-
portant class of utility functions because of the mathematical tractability. A utility
function U(x) is called HARA if the reciprocal of its absolute risk aversion is a linear
function of wealth X. That is to say,
1
ARA(X)
=
X
1− γ +
b
a
, (2.49)
where ARA(X) = −U ′′(X)
U ′(X) with a > 0, X > 0 and
aX
1−γ + b > 0. Thus, a HARA
utility function has the form:
U(X) =
1− γ
γ
(
aX
1− γ + b
)γ
. (2.50)
Two popular forms of HARA utility functions are Constant Absolute Risk Aver-
sion (CARA) utility function and Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility
function. CARA utility function shows people invest the same amount of money in
risky asset with the increase of their portfolio while CRRA utility function assume
people are willing to keep a specific percentage of their portfolio in risky asset. To
be specific, CARA utility function requires ARA is a constant. This means γ in
equation (2.49) goes to positive or negative infinity. Exponential utility function is
the unique example of CARA. It has the form
U(X) = 1− exp(−αX), α 6= 0. (2.51)
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A CRRA utility function should have a constant Relative Risk Aversion (RRA)
which is defined as
RRA(X) = −XU
′′(X)
U ′(X)
. (2.52)
Some forms of CRRA utility function can be expressed as:
u(X) =

X1−η−1
1−η , η 6= 1,
ln(X), η = 1.
(2.53)
2.3.1.1 Merton’s solution
As we explained above, people’s preference can be modelled as concave utility func-
tion. In order to see how to employ EUT in the context of lifetime investment and
pension products, we examine a classical asset-allocation problem which was first
solved by Merton (1969). Specifically, suppose a world where investors can only
invest money into one risky asset and one risk free asset. How should people dis-
tribute their wealth into these two assets to give them the largest expected utility,
if their utility function is CRRA? This can be formulated as a stochastic optimal
control problem. In the following, we give a solution using a method from dynamic
programming. The idea is to construct a partial differential equation, the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation. The solution to the HJB equation is the solution
to the above problem. We follow (Bjo¨rk, 2004, Chapter 19) closely in deriving the
solution to this problem.
Specifically, investors start to invest their money into the two available assets
at time 0 and receive all the money at time T . The dynamic process of the price of
risky asset St is:
dSt = µStdt+ σStdWt, S0 = s0, a.s. (2.54)
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where µ is assumed to be constant expected return, σ > 0 is the constant volatility
of the underlying risky asset and W is a standard Brownian motion process W :=
{Wt : t ∈ [0, T ]} defined on a filtered probability space (Ω,F, (Ft),P) on the finite
interval [0, T ]. The process of risky free-asset Bt is given as:
dBt = rBtdt, (2.55)
where r is the risk free interest rate which is assumed constant.
Define a Ft-progressively measurable stochastic process pi ∈ [0, 1], where
E
∫ T
0
|pi(t,Xt)|2dt < ∞. pi(t,Xt) is the proportion of wealth invested into the risky
asset at time t. Then 1 − pi(t,Xt) is the fraction of the investor’s wealth invested
into the risk-free asset at time t. Here, borrowing and short selling are not allowed,
i.e. pi(t,Xt) ∈ [0, 1] a.e. Thus, the dynamics of the investor’s wealth are
dXpit = X
pi
t [(1− pi(t,Xpit ))r + pi(t,Xpit )µ]dt+ pi(t,Xpit )σXpit dWt (2.56)
Xpi0 = x0 a.s. (2.57)
The wealth process Xt is called the state process and the portfolio process
pi(t,Xt) is the control process. The utility of terminal wealth is U(XT ). U is a
CRRA utility function of the form:
U(x) =
x1−λ
1− λ, x > 0, (2.58)
where 0 < λ < 1 . A higher λ indicates a higher degree of risk aversion.
Our aim is to maximize the discounted expected utility of terminal wealth
given the initial wealth x0 > 0. That is to say, we are maximising the value function
J : [0, T ]× R+ × [0, 1]→ R+ below.
J (t, x, pi) = E (U(XpiT )|Xpit = x0) . (2.59)
The XpiT is the wealth process obtained by following a specific admissible portfolio
pi. Bjo¨rk (2004) gives the definition of an admissible control as:
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A portfolio pi is called admissible if
• pi(t, x) ∈ Π for t ∈ R+ and x ∈ R+.
• for any given begin state (t, x), the SDE
dXs = µ(s,Xs, pi(s,Xs))ds+ σ(s,Xs, pi(s,Xs))dWs (2.60)
Xt = x (2.61)
has a unique solution.
Let A(x) denote the class of admissible portfolio with
A(x) := {pi : [0, T ]×R→ R : pi(t, y) ∈ Π, ∀ t ∈ [0, T ], y ∈ R} . (2.62)
Our aim now is to find an admissible control rule pio so that
J (t, x, pio) = sup
pi∈A(x)
E[U(XpiT )|Xpit = x]. (2.63)
The optimal value function is defined as
V (t, x) = J (t, x, pio), ∀(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R+. (2.64)
Now we need to derive the HJB partial differential equation. Assume investors
use two strategies to allocate their money:
• Strategy 1. Use optimal control rule pio. The optimal discounted expected
utility given by this strategy is
V (t, x) = E[U(XpioT )|Xt = x]. (2.65)
• Strategy 2. Use an arbitrary strategy pi first over time period [t, t + h] for a
quite short time period h > 0 and then choose the optimal strategy for the
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rest of time. The utility generated by this strategy can be expressed as
E[V (t+ h,Xpit+h)|Xpit = x]. (2.66)
As strategy 1 is always the optimal one, the following inequality holds:
V (t, x) ≥ E[V (t+ h,Xpit+h)|Xt = x]. (2.67)
It is assumed that V is a smooth function. According to Itoˆ formula, we have
V (t+ h,Xpit+h) = V (t,X
pi
t )
+
∫ t+h
t
{
∂V (s,Xpis )
∂t
+ [(1− pi(s,Xs))r + pi(s,Xs)µ]Xpis
∂V (s,Xpis )
∂x
+
1
2
pi2(s,Xs)σ
2(Xpis )
2∂
2V (s,Xpis )
∂x2
}
ds+
∫ t+h
t
σ
∂V (s,Xpis )
∂x
dWs. (2.68)
If enough integrability is assumed, the expectation of the stochastic integral is zero.
Thus, substituting equation (2.68) into inequality (2.67) gives:
E
[∫ t+h
t
[
∂V (s,Xpis )
∂t
+ [(1− pi(s,Xs))r + pi(s,Xs)µ]x∂V (s,X
pi
s )
∂x
+
1
2
pi2(s,Xs)σ
2x2
∂2V (s,Xpis )
∂x2
]
ds|Xt = x
]
≤ 0. (2.69)
Letting h → 0, Xt = x and dividing equation(2.69) by h, we can get the following
partial differential equation (PDE) for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R+:
∂V (t, x)
∂t
+[(1−pi(t, x))r+pi(t, x)µ]x∂V (t, x)
∂x
+
1
2
pi2(t, x)σ2x2
∂2V (t, x)
∂x2
≤ 0. (2.70)
The equality in the above equation only holds when the arbitrary strategy pi equals
to the optimal strategy pio. For (t, x) ∈ (0, T ) × R+ and pi(t, x) ∈ [0, 1], the HJB
equation can be expressed as

∂V (t,x)
∂t
+ suppi∈A(x)
{
[(1− pi(t, x))r + pi(t, x)µ]x∂V (t,x)
∂x
+ 1
2
pi2(t, x)σ2x2 ∂
2V (t,x)
∂x2
}
= 0,
V (T, x) = U(x).
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(2.71)
In the above, we have shown that if V is the optimal value function and pio
is the optimal control rule, then V and pio is the solution and responding control
rule to the HJB equation. The above result shows the HJB equation is a necessary
condition of the optimal control problem. In the following we will show that the
HJB equation is also a sufficient condition of the problem. That is to say if we have a
sufficiently integrable function H and control rule pig solves the HJB equation, then
the function H is the optimal value function and control rule pig is the admissible
control rule. We know that

∂H(t,x)
∂t
+ [(1− pig(t, x))r + pig(t, x)µ]x∂H(t,x)∂x +
1
2
pi2g(t, x)σ
2x2 ∂
2H(t,x)
∂x2
= 0, ∀ (t, x) ∈ (0, T )× R+
H(T, x) = U(x), ∀ x ∈ R+
(2.72)
where pig satisfies
[(1− pig(t, x))r + pig(t, x)µ]x∂H(t, x)
∂x
+
1
2
pi2g(t, x)σ
2x2
∂2H(t, x)
∂x2
= sup
pi∈A(x)
{
[(1− pi(t, x))r + pi(t, x)µ]x∂V (t, x)
∂x
+
1
2
pi2(t, x)σ2x2
∂2V (t, x)
∂x2
}
.
(2.73)
As H is smooth, the following can be derived by Itoˆ formula.
H(T,X
pig
T ) = H(t,Xt) +
∫ T
t
{
∂H(s,Xs)
∂t
+ [(1− pig(s,Xs))r + pig(s,Xs)µ]Xs∂H(s,Xs)
∂x
+
1
2
pi2g(s,Xs)σ
2X2s
∂2H(s,Xs)
∂x2
}
ds+
∫ T
t
σ
∂H(s,Xs)
∂x
dWs. (2.74)
Inserting equation(2.72) with x := Xs and t := s into Equation (2.74) and taking
conditional expectations based on the information available at time t shows
H(t, x) = E
[
U(X
pig
T )|X(t) = x
]
= J (t, x, pig). (2.75)
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As the optimal strategy should give the largest utility, we have
V (t, x) ≥ J (t, x, pig) = H(t, x). (2.76)
Additionally, assume an arbitrary control rule pi ∈ A(x) was chosen. Then according
to Itoˆ formula, we have
H(T,XpiT ) = H(t, x) +
∫ T
t
{
∂H(s,Xs)
∂t
+ [(1− pi(s,Xs))r + pi(s,Xs)µ]x∂H(s,Xs)
∂x
+
1
2
pi2(s,Xs)σ
2x2
∂2H(s,Xs)
∂x2
}
ds+
∫ T
t
σ
∂H(s,Xs)
∂x
dWs. (2.77)
As H is a solution to the HJB equation, we have:
∂H(t, x)
∂t
+ [(1− pi(t))r + pi(t)µ]x∂H(t, x)
∂x
+
1
2
pi2(t)σ2x2
∂2H(t, x)
∂x2
≤ 0. (2.78)
Substituting Equation (2.78) into Equation (2.77) gives:
H(t, x) ≥ U(XpiT )−
∫ T
t
σ
∂H(s,Xs)
∂x
dWs. (2.79)
Taking the conditional expectation of both sides of Equation (2.79) shows:
H(t, x) ≥ E [U(XpiT )|X(t) = x] = J (t, x, pi). (2.80)
As pi is an arbitrary control rule, so the following equation naturally holds.
H(t, x) ≥ sup
pi∈A(x)
J (t, x, pi) = V (t, x). (2.81)
Combining Equation (2.76) and Equation (2.81) shows
H(t, x) = V (t, x) = J (t, x, pig). (2.82)
This is shows that H is the optimal value function and pig is the optimal control
rule. In other words, the solution to the HJB PDE is the solution to our optimal
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problem. In the following, the derivation of the solution to the HJB PDE (Equation
(2.71)) is given. As we know the form of utility function, thus we could guess a
solution has the form like:
V (t, x) = y(t)u(x), (2.83)
where y is a function of t. Taking the partial derivatives gives us:
∂V
∂t
= y′(t)u(x) = y′(t)
x1−λ
1− λ, (2.84)
∂V
∂x
= y(t)u′(x) = y(t)x−λ, (2.85)
∂2V
∂x2
= y(t)u′′(x) = −y(t)λx−λ−1. (2.86)
Substitute the equations (2.84), (2.85) and (2.86) into the HJB equation (2.71) and
we have:
∂V (t, x)
∂t
+ sup
pi∈A(x)
{
[(1− pi(t, x))r + pi(t, x)µ]x∂V (t, x)
∂x
+
1
2
pi2(t, x)σ2x2
∂2V (t, x)
∂x2
}
= 0
⇔ y′(t) x
1−λ
1− λ +
x1−λ
1− λ(1− λ)y(t) suppi∈A(x)
{
[(1− pi(t, x))r + pi(t, x)µ]− 1
2
pi2(t, x)σ2λ
}
= 0
⇔ y′(t)u(x) + u(x)(1− λ)y(t) sup
pi∈A(x)
{
[(1− pi(t, x))r + pi(t, x)µ]− 1
2
pi2(t, x)σ2λ
}
= 0.
(2.87)
As u(x) > 0, we divided u(x) on both sides of the above equation. Then we have
y′(t) + p(t)y(t) = 0; (2.88)
p(t) = (1− λ) sup
pi∈A(x)
{
[(1− pi(t, x))r + pi(t, x)µ]− 1
2
pi2(t, x)σ2λ
}
; (2.89)
y(T ) = 1. (2.90)
First, we should find the pio which satisfy the supremum in Equation (2.89). We
take the first order derivative of Equation (2.89) with respect to pi and let it equals
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to 0, then we get:
(µ− r)− pio(t, x)λσ2 = 0. (2.91)
Transforming the above equation gives
pio(t, x) =
µ− r
λσ2
. (2.92)
As all parameters in the right hand side of equation(2.92) are given constants, then
pio is also a constant. Substituting Equation (2.92) into Equation (2.89) shows
p(t) = p for all t ∈ [0, T ], with
p := (1− λ)
[
r +
(µ− r)2
2σ2λ
]
. (2.93)
Then our problem becomes to solve the following ODE:
y′(t) + py(t) = 0 ⇔ y(t) = exp (−pt).
As y(T ) = 1, thus the solution is given as
V (t, x) = y(t)u(x) = exp (p(T − t))u(x). (2.94)
Here, we can conclude that under a CRRA utility function, the proportion of
wealth invested in the risky asset is constant.
2.3.2 Cumulative prospect theory
In this section, we introduce a behavioural model of explaining people’s decision
making under uncertainty: cumulative prospect theory (CPT). Expected utility
theory (EUT) is a normative theory which suggests how people should behave. It
assumes that people are rational. However, in practice, people sometimes make
irrational decisions. CPT, on the other hand, is a descriptive theory which shows
how people do behave.
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Although expected utility theory was viewed as a dominant tool to describe
individuals’ behaviour under uncertainty for many years, many violations of EUT
suggest it is not an adequate descriptive model in decision making. Tversky and
Kahneman (1992) list five violations of EUT: framing effects, non-linear preferences,
source dependence, risk seeking and loss aversion. Rabin (2000) also provides ev-
idence that EUT is not a good model to explain risk aversion over modest risks.
In addition, EUT utility functions depend only on the final wealth rather than the
change of wealth, which violate the practice. In order to better explain people’s
behaviour in decision making under uncertainty, Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
proposed Cumulative Prospect Theory.
Before introducing this new theory, some definitions are presented below. Let
f denote a risky prospect (x−m, p−m;x−m+1, p−m+1; ...;x0, p0; ...;xn−1, pn−1;xn, pn)
where xi is an outcome of the prospect and pi is corresponding probability for
i = −m,−m + 1, ..., n. Under CPT, outcomes are compared to a reference point
which is often the current state. In this paper, we only concern the utility of money,
the reference point denotes the current wealth. Hence, positive outcome represents
the profit while negative outcome indicates the loss. Outcomes are arranged in
ascending order in the prospect. That is to say if i < j, then xi < xj. Additionally,
a positive subscript denotes a positive outcome and a negative subscript denotes a
negative outcome. And zero subscript denotes neutral outcome. Let f+ denotes the
positive part of f and f− denotes the negative part of f . As CPT evaluates gains
and losses separately, the overall utility is the sum of utility of positive part and the
utility of negative part.
The utility of a prospect in CPT is calculated by a value function and a
weight function. The value function in CPT is monotonically increasing and sat-
isfies v(x0) = v(0) = 0. The weight function is expressed as a capacity function
w : [0, 1] → [0, 1] (Choquet (1954)) which is a scaling of probabilities. For positive
prospects, the decision weight pi+i is
pi+i = w
+(pi + ...+ pn)− w+(pi+1 + ...+ pn). (2.95)
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Similarly, the decision weight for negative prospects is:
pi−i = w
−(p−m + ...+ pi)− w−(p−m + ...+ pi−1). (2.96)
A capacity function satisfies w(φ) = 0 and w(S) = 1 where φ denotes the empty
set and S stands for a universal set. For any set A,B ∈ S, if A ⊂ B, w(A) ≤ w(B).
Now, the utility function for a prospect (x−m, p−m; ...;x0, p0; ...xn, pn) are given as:
V (f) = V (f+) + V (f−) =
∑n
i=0 pi
+
i v(xi) +
∑0
i=−m pi
−
i v(xi), −m < i < n.
(2.97)
Based on experimental analysis and non-linear regression, Tversky and Kahne-
man (1992) approximate the value function with a two-part power function:
v(x) =
 x
α if x ≥ 0
−λ(−x)β if x < 0,
(2.98)
where λ = 2.25 and α = β = 0.88. They also give the form of capacity function as
w+(p) = p
γ
(pγ+(1−p)γ)
1
γ
,
w−(p) = p
δ
(pδ+(1−p)δ) 1δ
,
(2.99)
where γ = 0.61 and δ = 0.69. The values of pi+i and pi
−
i are calculated via equations
(2.95) and (2.96).
Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 plot a value function and weighting function of CPT. It
is seen that the shape of the value function is like an “S” and the shape of weighting
function is an inverse “S”. The shape of the value function shows a diminishing
sensitivity from the reference point in both the positive part and negative part. The
concavity in positive domain shows people are risk averse in returns while convexity
in negative domain tells people are risk seeking in loss. This is supported by the
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Figure 2.1: Value function based on equation (2.98) where λ = 2.25 and α = β =
0.88.
Figure 2.2: Weighting function based on equation (2.99) where γ = 0.61 and δ =
0.69.
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observation that people prefer a substantial probability of a loss to a sure reduced
loss. Additionally, the curvature for losses is steeper than for gains.
The weighting function shows risk seeking and risk aversion for gains and losses
of small probabilities, respectively. It also suggests risk aversion and risk seeking for
gains and losses of high probability. In other words, the weighting function is a non-
linear function of probabilities. It overvalues small probabilities and undervalues
moderate and high probabilities.
CPT is viewed as a better model to capture the features of human’s behaviour
than EUT. However, it also has some limitations. For instance, Ingersoll (2008)
suggests Tversky-Kahneman’s probability weighting function is decreasing for some
values of its parameters. In which case, the CPT is inconsistent with the first-
order stochastic dominance. Ingersoll (2008) also lists some alternative weighting
functions which could avoid this issue. These weighting functions include
• Prelec (1998)’s weighting function
w(p) = e−(− ln p)
ϕ
. (2.100)
• Lattimore et al. (1992)’s weighting function
w(p) =
φpη
φpη + (1− p)η . (2.101)
In each case, 0 < η ≤ 1, φ > 0 and ϕ > 0.
Døskeland and Nordahl (2008b) suggest Prelec’s weighting function is based on
behavioural axioms rather than mathematical convenience. In Chapter 5, the Prelec
(1998)’s weighting function is used to calculate the CPT utility.
In addition, Shafir and LeBoeuf (2002) and Newell et al. (2015) argue that
emotion is an important factor in people’s decision process but CPT fails to take it
into account.
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2.3.3 The design of pension products
As we introduced above, mathematical expectation, Expected Utility Theory (EUT)
and Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) are all used to understand how people make
decisions under uncertainty. Mathematical expectations is the sum of the product
of possible payoffs and their responding probabilities. In order to take account of
individuals’ risk preferences, EUT calculates the sum of the product of the utility of
possible payoffs and the responding probabilities. As empirical evidence suggests a
non-linear probability function is better to explain how people deal with probabili-
ties, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) propose CPT by using subjective probabilities
in the calculation of the utility of a prospect. In addition, the inclusion of the loss
aversion in the value function is another distinctive feature of CPT.
Buying pensions is making a long-term investment for people’s spending after
retirement. Pension contracts, essentially, stands for the underlying investment
strategy. Hence, the process of designing a pension contract is to find the optimal
investment strategy based on the customers’ preferences.
The optimal investment strategy under the EUT has been well studied in the
academic literature. By assuming a Black-Scholes world, the optimal investment
strategy is to put a constant portion in the risky asset over the investment horizon,
which maximises the EUT utility (Merton, 1969). The dynamic portfolio is given in
Figure 2.3. Thus, a pension contract following this constant proportion investment
strategy is the optimal pension product for EUT-maximising customers.
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Figure 2.3: Dynamic optimal portfolio for two assets under EUT.
Due to the complexity of CPT, a closed formula for the optimal strategy is
hard to obtain. However, a Monte Carlo simulation provides an approximation for
the optimal dynamic investment strategy, shown in Figure 2.4. We can see that
the dynamic optimal investment strategy is to decrease the exposure to the risky
asset as the investment horizon shortens. This strategy conforms to the life style
investment strategy, that people should invest more money in risky assets when they
are young and reduce their exposure to risky assets when they are getting old. In
this sense, an optimal pension contract for a CPT customer should follow this life
style investment strategy.
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Figure 2.4: Dynamic optimal portfolio for two assets under CPT.
In this thesis, a large part of the study is carried out under the CPT. We believe
CPT is able to capture more features of people’s behaviours under uncertainty. As
pension contracts, essentially, represent the underlying investment strategy, the op-
timal investment strategy under the CPT provides the intuition for the development
of our new contract.
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Return smoothing method in a
Pension contract: risk emerges
3.1 Introduction
With-profits contract, or participating policy in US, is one of the most popular
products in the life insurance industry. It is an insurance contract that has access
to the profit of the insurance company. With-profits contract typically consists of a
term life insurance contract and a savings vehicle, or you could say an endowment
assurance contract. A benefit is provided if the life insured died within the term
and a lump sum is paid out if the policyholder survives to a known date. As we are
keen on the investment characteristic of with-profits contract, the term insurance
part is not considered in the paper. Instead, we focus on the pure investment part
with-profits contracts.
With-profits contracts are designed to protect the customers against short term
fluctuations in investment returns while providing them with a competitive long term
rate of return. As customers’ premiums are generally pooled into an investment
fund which is highly exposed to the equity market, the short term return of the
underlying investment is very volatile. In order to mitigate the short term adverse
price movement of the underlying fund, with-profits contracts generally give the
customer a smoothed return. Additionally, a customer’s downside risk which arises
from the possibility of a sustained decrease in the financial market is limited by the
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guarantees embedded in with-profits contracts. Moreover, the guaranteed amount
of a customer’s payout can be increased by the declaration of the bonuses by the
insurer.
As the with-profits contract is generally viewed as savings-investment product
with embedded interest rate guarantees, option pricing theory or contingent claim
pricing is widely used in their valuation. Specifically, Wilkie (1987) was the first
to apply option pricing theory to the pricing of with-profits contracts. Since then,
a number of papers have explored the pricing of with-profits contracts. Briys and
De Varenne (1997) propose a simple closed form solution to value the liabilities
of with-profits contracts from the perspective of the insurer by using a contingent
claim methodology. Grosen and Jørgensen (2000) study a with-profits contract by
decomposing it into two parts, the customer account and the bonus account. As
the closed form formula for the pricing of the contract is not available, Grosen
and Jørgensen (2000) show us how to use numerical methods - the Monte Carlo
simulation and the binomial tree - to price with-profits contracts. Jensen et al. (2001)
study the same model but use a finite difference algorithm to value the contract,
which provides faster and more accurate results. Grosen and Jørgensen (2000)
extend their previous research by considering the lapse in which case the value of a
surrender option should be calculated when pricing the contract. Bacinello (2003)
study the surrender option of a particular with-profits contract which is sold in
Italy. They suggest that surrender option works like an American-style put option,
so that backward recursive binomial methods can be used to price the contract.
Bacinello (2001) shows how to price a with-profits contract when mortality risk is
considered, which makes the theoretical pricing model even closer to practice. Most
conventional contracts give guarantees for free, which leads to the contracts being
issued in favor of the policyholders from the perspective of risk-neutral pricing. By
applying financial engineering techniques, Hansen and Miltersen (2002) show two
ways to charge the fees of issuing guarantees.
The value of a with-profits contract is affected by: the guaranteed interest
rate at which the premiums are accumulated, the bonus rate which is added to the
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guarantee rate if the underlying investment performed better than it was predicted,
the participation rate in the profit of the insurer and the volatility of the underlying
investment. In addition, the premium schedule (like how much and how often to pay
the premium) and expense also has impact on the pricing of the with-profits contract.
The guarantee rate, bonus rate and participation rate are generally determined by
the insurer. By fixing all but one parameters, the last parameter can be determined
to make the contract fair. Bacinello (2001) gives a detailed instructions of how to set
the parameters to get a fair contract. The volatility sometimes cannot be controlled
by the insurer and only can be observed from the market. However, in some other
cases, if the insurer is able to change their investment portfolio, the volatility can
also be affected by the insurance company. Kleinow and Willder (2007) and Kleinow
(2009) study the case that the investment portfolio of the with-profits contracts is
absolutely controlled by the management discretion.
Smoothing is viewed as a virtue of with-profits contracts as it reduces the fluc-
tuation of the underlying investment. However, as the smoothing mechanism is
generally complex and opaque, only a few paper touches on the smoothing mech-
anism of with-profits products. In order to have a deeper understanding of the
with-profits contracts, this chapter studies an interesting UK with-profits contract
in detail.
In this paper, we present the pricing of a with-profits contract with smoothing
mechanism and discuss how the smoothing method could affect the price.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The next section intro-
duces the structure of this with-profits contract and the market model. Section 3.3
shows the effects of smoothing and then derives the closed form solution for a fair
price of this contract. Section 3.4 studies a special risk arising from the smoothing
mechanism. As the contract is not a fair contract for the insurer, Section 3.5 dis-
cusses the effects of charging an annual management fee. Moreover, the risk sharing
of with-profits contracts between different generations are discussed in this paper.
The last section is the conclusion.
44
Chapter 3: Return smoothing method in a Pension contract: risk emerges
3.2 Model
3.2.1 Contract
In this chapter, we introduce an interesting with-profits contract in UK. In order
to focus on the structure of this contract, we do not consider mortality and lapse.
Additionally, neither expenses nor administrative costs are taken into account. The
contract is assumed to be a single premium contract. The premium P is paid at start
and then invested in an investment fund managed by the insurer. The underlying
fund consists of one risky asset and one risk free asset. The rate of return of the
fund in year n is denoted by Rn ∈ R and is independent with other years. The term
of this contract is N years. Because of the embedded guarantees and the possible
bonus, on the maturity date N , the policyholder receives a terminal payout which is
determined by the value of the underlying investment and the guaranteed amount
of money. The guarantee is provided by the insurer for free. Let An denote the
underlying value of the policyholder’s underlying investment at the end of year n
for n ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, ..., N}, then
An =
 P, n = 0An−1(1 +Rn), n ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..., N}. (3.1)
As we mentioned earlier, the return of the underlying fund is volatile due to the
exposure to the equity market. To reduce the volatility on the customer’s payoff,
the insurer increases the policyholder’s account value A˜n at a smoothed return R˜n
rather than the real investment return of the underlying fund. The smoothed return
R˜n over year n is defined as a geometric mean of yearly returns for five years
1, i.e.
R˜n = [(1 +Rn−2)(1 +Rn−1)(1 +Rn)(1 +Rn+1)(1 +Rn+2)]
1
5 − 1. (3.2)
It is important to point out here that the return Rn+1 and Rn+2 are not known at
the end of year n. The smoothed return R˜n is Fn+2-measurable where Fn+2 is the
information available at time n+ 2. And the expected smoothed return over year n
1This 5-year geometric average smoothing method is specified in insurer’s product booklet.
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is
E[R˜n|Fn]
=[(1 +Rn−2)(1 +Rn−1)(1 +Rn)]
1
5E[(1 +Rn+1)
1
5 |Fn]E[(1 +Rn+2) 15 |Fn]− 1.
(3.3)
In practice, when the insurer is calculating the smoothed return at the end of year
n, the insurer use their best knowledge to estimate the return in year n + 1 and
n+ 2. That is to say, for k = 1, 2, the insurer sets the conditional random variable
E[(1 +Rn+k)
1
5 |Fn] = (1 + E[Rn+k|Fn]) 15 . (3.4)
It is worth stressing that the above formula is not mathematically correct but it is
assumed in practice. Then
E[R˜n|Fn]
=[(1 +Rn−2)(1 +Rn−1)(1 +Rn)]
1
5E[(1 +Rn+1)
1
5 |Fn]E[(1 +Rn+2) 15 |Fn]− 1
=[(1 +Rn−2)(1 +Rn−1)(1 +Rn)(1 + E[Rn+1|Fn])(1 + E[Rn+2|Fn])] 15 − 1
(3.5)
After the policy progresses to year n+ 1, the realised return Rn+1 becomes known.
The smoothed return E[R˜n|Fn] is then updated with the known fund return Rn+1
replacing E[Rn+1|Fn]. In addition, E[Rn+2|Fn] is replaced by the new best estimated
return E[Rn+2|Fn+1]. For instance, at the end of year 1, the insurer is aware of the
return of the underlying fund in year 1 (current year), 0 (last year) and -1 (the year
before last year). But the returns for year 2 and year 3 are unknown. When the
insurer calculates the smoothed return R˜1 in year 1, estimated returns are needed
for year 2 and 3, respectively. At time 2, the return over year 2 is known, so
the insurer needs to replace the estimated return E[R2|F1] and E[R3|F1] with the
realized return R2 and E[R3|F2], respectively, for the re-calculation of the smoothed
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return E[R˜1|F2]. The new smoothed return in year n at time n+ 1 is
E[R˜n|Fn+1]
=[(1 +Rn−2)(1 +Rn−1)(1 +Rn)(1 +Rn+1)]
1
5 (1 + E[Rn+2|Fn+1]) 15 − 1 (3.6)
At time n + 2, all the returns in the calculation of the smoothed return R˜n are
known, i.e.,
R˜n = E[R˜n|Fn+2]
= [(1 +Rn−2)(1 +Rn−1)(1 +Rn)(1 +Rn+1)(1 +Rn+2)]
1
5 − 1 (3.7)
And the policyholder’s account value is calculated as:
A˜n = P
n∏
k=1
(1 + E[R˜k|Fn]) (3.8)
Policyholder’s terminal payout on maturity N is the maximum of the terminal value
of the guaranteed amount and the customer account, that is
PON = max(GN , A˜N). (3.9)
Here the guaranteed value process Gn is given as
Gn =
 P, n = 0Gn−1(1 + g + βn), n ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..., N}. (3.10)
where g ≥ 0 denotes the guaranteed growth rate and βn ≥ 0 is the bonus rate
applied at each time n.
3.2.2 Market Model
Before we derive the pricing formula of this contract, the market model is introduced.
The policyholder’s premium is invested in a fund which consists of only two assets,
one risk free asset and one risky asset. Let r denote the constant risk free interest
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rate and the evolution of the value of the risk free asset is given as:
dBt = rBtdt, B0 = b, (3.11)
The price of the risky asset is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion.
 S0 = sdSt = µStdt+ σStdW Pt , (3.12)
where the expected growth rate µ, and volatility σ are positive constants. W Pt :=
{W Pt : t ∈ [0, T ]} is a Wiener process defined on the filtered probability space
(Ω,F, (Ft),P) on the finite interval [0, T ].
A constant mix strategy is assumed to be followed by the underlying fund, which
means that a constant proportion of the fund value is invested in the risky asset and
the risk free asset at all times. The proportion of the value of the fund invested in
the risky asset is called equity-backed ratio in with-profits business, which is pre-
defined in the contract. Let a constant δ ∈ [0, 1] denote the equity-backed ratio.
Then the dynamics of the fund value Ft are F0 = P ;dFt = (r + (µ− r)δ)Ftdt+ σδFtdW Pt . (3.13)
As we are studying the financial fairness of this contract, a risk neutral mea-
sure Q is need to calculate the fair price of the contract. Denoting by WQt :=
WQt : t ∈ [0, T ] a Brownian motion under Q, the dynamics of the fund value can be
written as F0 = P ;dFt = rFtdt+ vFtdWQt . (3.14)
where v = δσ. Then the return Rn in year n is
Rn =
Fn
Fn−1
−1 = exp [r − 1
2
v2 + v(WQn −WQn−1)]−1 for n = 1, 2, 3...N. (3.15)
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3.3 Pricing
In this part, a closed form solution to the pricing of this contract is presented.
3.3.1 Smoothing mechanism
Recall that policyholder’s terminal payout is the maximum of the terminal value of
the guaranteed amount and the customer’s account. Rewrite Equation (3.9) as
PON = GN + max(0, A˜N −GN). (3.16)
It is observed from the above equation that the customer’s payout is the sum of
the terminal guaranteed value and the payoff of a call option, where the guaranteed
value GN is the strike price and the customer’s account value is the price of the
underlying asset. As the guaranteed value GN can be calculated from Equation
(3.10), the expected value of the terminal payout can be calculated if the payoff
of this call option is known. However, the distribution of the terminal value of
customer’s account A˜N is not known, the existing Black-Scholes formula cannot be
used directly to express the payoff. In the following, we derive the distribution of
the terminal value of policyholder’s account.
From Equation (3.15), we know 1 +Rn follows the log normal distribution with
location (r− 1
2
v2) and scale v. Let Yn = 1+Rn, then {Yn}Nn=1 are independent copies
of a log-normal distributed random variable Y , and Y ∼ logN(r − 1
2
v2, v2). Recall
that the value of customer’s account increases at the smoothed returns. Then the
expected value of the customer’s account under the risk neutral measure Q at the
end of the contract is
EQ[A˜N ] = E
Q
[
P (1 + R˜1)(1 + R˜2) · · · (1 + EQ[R˜N−1|FN ])(1 + EQ[R˜N |FN ])
]
=EQ
[
P [(Y−1)(Y0)(Y1)(Y2)(Y3)]
1
5 · · ·
= [(YN−2)(YN−1)(YN)(1 + EQ[RN+1|FN ])(1 + EQ[RN+2|FN ])] 15
]
. (3.17)
When we calculate the terminal value of the policyholder’s account, after the up-
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dating of estimated returns, only two estimated returnsEQ[RN+1|FN ] andEQ[RN+2|FN ]
are in the formula. In terms of pricing, the insurer use the current risk free rate
of interest as the best estimation of the returns in year N + 1 and N + 2. In a
Black-Scholes world, thus, the estimated returns are are assumed to be the constant
risk free interest rate r. Thus, the expected value of the customer’s account at the
end of the contract is
EQ[A˜N ] = E
Q
[
P [(Y−1)(Y0)(Y1)(Y2)(Y3)]
1
5 · · · [(YN−2)(YN−1)(YN) exp (2r)] 15
]
.
(3.18)
For simplicity, we let the initial premium P = 1. As Yn are independent, then
Equation (3.18) becomes
EQ[A˜N ] = E
Q
[
(Y−1)
1
5 (Y0)
2
5 (Y1)
3
5 (Y2)
4
5 (ΠN−2n=3 Yi)(YN−1)
4
5 (YN)
3
5 exp (2r)
3
5
]
=EQ[Y
1
5 ]EQ[Y
2
5 ]EQ[Y
3
5 ]2EQ[Y
4
5 ]2EQ[Y ]N−4 exp (
3r
5
). (3.19)
Equation (3.19) is the product of log normal moments. From the properties of
log-normal distribution, for any real numbers k, the k-th moment of a log-normally
distributed variable is
EQ[Y k] = exp (k(r − 1
2
v2) +
1
2
k2v2). (3.20)
Now we can calculate the expected terminal value of customer’s account as
EQ[A˜N ] = exp (Nr − 3
5
v2) for N ≥ 5. (3.21)
Similarly, we calculate the variance of the terminal value of the customer by
V Q[A˜N ] =E
Q[(A˜N)
2]− (EQ[A˜N ])2
= exp (2Nr + (N − 3)v2)− exp (2Nr − 6
5
v2). (3.22)
As A˜N is a log normal random variable and the first two moments are already
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obtained, the terminal customer account value can be written as
A˜N = P exp [(r − 1
2
(1− 3
5N
)v2)N +
√
(1− 9
5N
)v
√
NZ]
= P exp [(r − 1
2
(1− 3
5N
)v2)N +
√
(1− 9
5N
)vWQN ] (3.23)
where Z is a standard normal random variable.
3.3.2 Pricing of the contract
Recall that the payoff of the contract is the maximised value of A˜N and the guar-
anteed value GN . As the distribution for the A˜N is obtained above, we can derive
the payout as long as the terminal guaranteed amount is known. For simplicity, it
is assumed that the annual guarantee rate is constant and no terminal bonus will
be given. In this sense, the guaranteed amount increases at a deterministic rate.
Assume that the GN is a constant and take the expectation of Equation (3.9)
and discount back to the starting time, i.e.,
EQ[e−rNPON ] = e−rNEQ[max(A˜N −GN , 0)] + e−rNGN
= e−rN
∫ ∞
−∞
max
(
Pe(r−
1
2
(1− 3
5N
)v2)N+
√
(1− 9
5N
)v
√
Ny −GN , 0
)
f(y)dy + e−rNGN .
(3.24)
The integrand is zero when
Pe(r−
1
2
(1− 3
5N
)v2)N+
√
(1− 9
5N
)v
√
Ny −GN ≤ 0, (3.25)
i.e. when
y ≤ −d2 = 1√
(1− 9
5N
)v
√
N
(
ln
(GN
P
)− (r − 1
2
(1− 3
5N
)v2
)
N
)
. (3.26)
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Now we need only to consider the integral when the integrand is positive, i.e.
EQ[e−rNPON ] =e−rN
∫ ∞
−d2
(
Pe(r−
1
2
(1− 3
5N
)v2)N+
√
(1− 9
5N
)v
√
Ny −GN
)
f(y)dy
+ e−rNGN
=e−rNP
∫ ∞
−d2
e(r−
1
2
(1− 3
5N
)v2)N+
√
(1− 9
5N
)v
√
Ny 1√
2pi
e−y
2/2dy
+ e−rNGN −GNe−rN
∫ ∞
−d2
1√
2pi
e−y
2/2dy. (3.27)
Completing the square on the exponent in the first integral
− 1
2
(1− 3
5N
)v2N +
√
1− 9
5N
v
√
Ny − 1
2
y2
− 1
2
(N − 3
5
)v2 +
√
N − 9
5
vy − 1
2
y2
= −1
2
(y −
√
N − 9
5
v)2 − 3
5
v2. (3.28)
Thus changing the variable in the first integrand to z := y −
√
N − 9
5
v, and using
Φ(x) to denote the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of a standard normal
random variable at the value x ∈ R,
EQ[e−rNPON ]
= Pe−
3
5
v2
∫ ∞
−d2
1√
2pi
e−
1
2
(y−
√
N− 9
5
v)2dy + e−rNGN −GNe−rN
∫ ∞
−d2
1√
2pi
e−y
2/2dy
= Pe−
3
5
v2
∫ ∞
−d2−
√
N− 9
5
v
1√
2pi
e−
1
2
z2dz + e−rNGN −GNe−rNΦ(d2)
= Pe−
3
5
v2Φ(d2 +
√
N − 9
5
v) + e−rNGN(1− Φ(d2))
= Pe−
3
5
v2Φ(d1) + e
−rNGN(1− Φ(d2))
= Pe−
3
5
v2Φ(d1) + e
−rNGNΦ(−d2), (3.29)
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where
d1 =
1√
(N − 9
5
)v
(
ln
( P
GN
)
+
(
r +
1
2
(1− 3
N
)v2
)
N
)
,
d2 =
1√
(N − 9
5
)v
(
ln
( P
GN
)
+
(
r − 1
2
(1− 3
5N
)v2
)
N
)
. (3.30)
An alternative solution which is much easier for the pricing formula of this contract
is given below. Equation (3.23) can also be written in the form of SDE, that is
 A˜0 = P ;dA˜t = (r − 35N v2)A˜tdt+√1− 95N vA˜tdWQt . (3.31)
If we let q = 3
5N
v2 and u =
√
1− 9
5N
v, then Equation (3.31) becomes
 A˜0 = P ;dA˜t = (r − q)A˜tdt+ uA˜tdWQt , (3.32)
which is similar to the SDE of stock price with continuous dividends. Recall that
the payout of this contract has the form
PON = max(GN , A˜N) = max(A˜N −GN , 0) +GN . (3.33)
In the last part of Equation (3.33), as A˜N follows a log-normal distribution and
GN works as a strike price, we directly write the pricing formula for this contract by
using Black-Scholes formula when the risky asset pays a continuous dividend. That
is
EQ[e−rNPON ] = GNe−rN + e−qN A˜′0Φ(d1)−GNe−rNΦ(d2) (3.34)
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where
d1 =
ln A˜0
GN
+ (r − q + 1
2
u2)N
u
√
N
=
1√
(N − 9
5
)v
(
ln
( P
GN
)
+
(
r +
1
2
(1− 3
N
)v2
)
N
)
,
d2 = d1 − u
√
N =
1√
(N − 9
5
)v
(
ln
( P
GN
)
+
(
r − 1
2
(1− 3
5N
)v2
)
N
)
,
(3.35)
which conforms to the previous result.
3.3.3 Numerical Results
In the above, the closed form solution of customer’s payout is derived. In order to
have a better understanding of this contract, we calculate the present value of the
contract by using the following group of parameters:
r = 0.02, σ = 0.2, N = 25, P = 1, δ = 0.82
As we discussed before, once the regular bonus is declared, the bonus becomes one
part of the guarantee. We let d = g + βn denote the revised guarantees. Table
3.1 shows the present value of each contract with different revised guarantees under
the risk neutral measure Q. The adjusted guarantees are assumed constant for the
whole period within the contract. We can see from the result that the present
values of the terminal payout are higher than the initial premium. In the case that
the revised guarantee rate is 0, customer is guaranteed to receive back his initial
premium. However, the expected value the customer receives is 7% higher than the
premium. As the guarantee is provided for free, the insurer actually undervalues
this with-profits contract. With the increase of the adjusted guarantee rate, the
contract becomes more valuable.
2The parameters are arbitrarily chosen for illustration. From 2009 to 2018, the US 10 year bond
yield was around 2.5% and the realised volatility of SP500 during the same period was 18.5%. The
choice of the parameters is reasonable.
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d = g + βn Present value of the terminal payout
0 1.0768
0.01 1.1573
0.02 1.2869
Table 3.1: Present value of the contract for different adjusted guaranteed rate d.
d is defined as the sum of bonus rate and the guaranteed growth rate. The other
parameter values are r = 0.02, σ = 0.2, N = 25, P = 1, δ = 0.8 .
3.4 Beating the insurance company: Speculating
entry
Because of the smoothing mechanism used in this contract, the terminal payout of
the contract not only depends on the performance of the underlying fund within
the term of the contract, but also on the return in the two years before the start of
the contract. Thus, the smart customer may choose to enter into the contract if he
observes that the underlying fund experienced good returns in the last two years.
In this case, we are interested in determining if the smart customer could have a
higher expected terminal payout.
In order to investigate this, a simplistic one-customer model is assumed. In
other words, there is no inter-generational effects in this case. The customer has
two strategies to buy the contract. The first one is called random entry in which
case the customer just buys the contract directly without knowing any information
about previous returns. The second strategy is speculating entry, which means the
customer only buys the contract if the returns in the last two years meet a specific
requirement. For instance, in this paper, the requirement is a higher than the risk
free rate return in the last two years, i.e. Y
1
5
−1Y
2
5
0 > exp (
r
5
) exp (2r
5
). In the following,
we derive the closed formula for the contract price of speculating entry.
Recall that the terminal value of the customer’s account is expressed as
A˜N = PY
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First, we let X = Y
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We conclude thatX ∼ logN(3
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and
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Thus, the distribution for X ′ is logN((N − 3
5
)r − (N
2
− 3
5
)v2, (N − 2)v2). Then the
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analytic formula for the expected payout of the contract for speculating entry, i.e.
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As A˜N = XX
′, Equation(3.41) can be written as
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For the numerator of the second term on the right-hand side, we have
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As it is showed above that X ∼ logN(3
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v2), then
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√
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where H ∈ N(0, 1) is a standard normal random variable. Substituting Equation
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(3.44) into Equation (3.43) gives
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Now change the variable of integration from log-normal random variable X to stan-
dard normal random variable H. First note that
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Let z = −(h−√0.2v), then Equation (3.45) becomes
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. We notice that Equa-
tion (3.47) has the same form as a bi-variate standard normal cumulative distribution
function (CDF). Thus, Equation (3.47) equals to
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Similarly, if we integrate with H, the second numerator in Equation (3.42) can be
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expressed as
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Let z′ = −h, then Equation (3.49) becomes
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Thus, the expression of the value of the contract for speculating entry is
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Discounting back to time 0, the closed formula of the price of the contract when
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the customer speculatively entering this contract is
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Comparing the above formula with Equation (3.34), we notice the two formulae look
very similar, the difference lie in the CDF functions which behaviour like probabili-
ties. As the closed formulae is obtained, the insurer is able to calculate the price in
an efficient way.
Similarly, we calculate the value of the contract for speculating entry with
different levels of guarantees, which are given in Table 3.2.
d = g + βn Random Entry Speculating Entry
0 1.0768 1.1294
0.01 1.1573 1.2058
0.02 1.2869 1.3270
Table 3.2: Present value of terminal payout for customers adopting different strate-
gies. The parameter values are r = 0.02, σ = 0.2, N = 25, P = 1, d = 0 and
δ = 1.
It is seen that speculating entry gives the customers a much higher payout than
the random entry customers. Hence, the speculating entry customer is compensated
by the customers purchase the contract when the return in previous two years is
bad. If there are more customers purchasing this contract speculatively, only buying
contracts when the return in previous two years are better than expected, the insurer
is not able to hedge this risk unless the insurer limit the number of policyholder in
a year. Otherwise, the insurer cannot invest enough in previous two years to pay
the higher than expected return.
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3.5 Making a fair contract
As we shown above, the contract is under-valued by the insurer. The insurer could
face a large risk if financial market returns decline. Hence, providing free guarantees
is not a good choice for the insurer. In the following, we show how much a fair annual
fee the insurer should charge for this contract.
It is assumed that an annual management fee is charged as a proportion m of
the customer account value at the end of each year to cover the cost of issuing the
guarantees. Then the customer account value after the deduction of the management
fee is given as
A˜AMFn = A˜n(1−m)n for n = 1, 2, 3, ..., N. (3.54)
Now the terminal value of customers account at the end of the contract is
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The fair price of the contract is
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(3.57)
In Table 3.3, the fair annual fees for different revised guarantees are presented.
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d = g + βn annual management fee m
0 0.0020
0.01 0.0102
0.02 0.0540
Table 3.3: Fair annual fees for different adjusted guaranteed rate d. d is defined as
the sum of bonus rate and the guaranteed growth rate. r = 0.02, σ = 0.2, N = 25,
P = 1, δ = 0.8.
As we cannot obtain an explicit formula for the annual management fee the result
is calculated by using Newton’s method.
3.6 Intergenerational Risk sharing and return re-
distribution
In Section 3.3, we have shown that the contract is not a fair contract. There is a
return distribution from the insurer to the policyholders. In practice, policyholders
enter into the contract at different times and their premiums are pooled in one
fund. Comparing to without-profits product and unit-linked products, with-profits
product is expected to reduce the risk of their policyholders by time diversification
and risk sharing between different generations. Døskeland and Nordahl (2008a) show
there exist a cross subsidisation from the pearly generations to the later generations
by examining one with-profits contract. In addition, Hieber et al. (2015) propose
that the cohort with lower guaranteed growth rates benefiting the cohort with higher
guaranteed rate. Thus, the fairness among different generations in the contract we
studied above is also interesting to us.
Because of the bonus and guarantees included in the pension contract, true
fairness is not likely to exist. Milevsky and Salisbury (2016) show the closest to
being truly fair is equitable which means the expected payout for each generation
is the same. That is, for any generation i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3, ...} and i 6= j, the following
equation always holds to justify the fairness.
E[POiN ] = E[PO
j
N ]. (3.58)
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Thus, in this part, we focus on the equitableness of this contract. As the
way in which bonuses are determined is subjective and opaque in practice, some
assumptions to make the bonus declaration process clear are stated here. Each
year, there is one and only one customer who enters into the contract. For any
generation, the guaranteed amount is always met by the insurer. In addition, the
bonus rate in year n is determined by the total assets ATOTn and total liabilities L
TOT
n
at time n. The total asset is the sum of the value of the underlying investment of
each generation whose policy is still valid. That is
ATOTn =

∑n
i=1A
i
n, n ≤ N∑n
i=n−N+1A
i
n, n > N.
(3.59)
where Ain denotes the underlying value of the investment for ith generation. Sim-
ilarly, the total liabilities is the sum of all guaranteed amount of the payout of all
the generations in force.
LTOTn =

∑n
i=1G
i
n, n ≤ N∑n
i=n−N+1G
i
n, n > N.
(3.60)
If the total asset value in year n is larger than the total liabilities at the end of
last year accumulated at the guarantee rate and the bonus rate, i.e. if ASn >
Ln−1(1 + g + β), then a bonus β is declared for that year. Otherwise, no bonus
is given in that year. In other words, if there is bonus declared in that year, the
adjusted guaranteed rate is g + β. If there is no bonus declared, the adjusted
guaranteed rate is g.
Thus, the declared bonus rate in a year is determined by the total assets and
total liabilities. Morevoer, the declared bonus rate in one year is the same for each
cohort. Hence, there exists an inter-generational risk transfer and return redistribu-
tion. To study the risk sharing effects, numerical simulation is used in calculating
the payout for each generation. We let β = 0.02 and g = 0. That is to say the
adjusted guaranteed rate is either 2% or 0%, the customer can at least get their
premium back.
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Figure 3.1 presents the expected payout for each generation when the expected
return of the underlying risky asset µ = 8% and σ = 20%. We can see that the
payout for later generation is higher. After the payout achieves the highest point
around 23rd generation, the payout decreases slightly and then becomes flat. As the
expected return is higher comparing to the increase of the liability, earlier generations
are more likely obtain positive return in which case leads to higher expected bonus
rate. This can be proved by Figure 3.2 which is the expected guaranteed amount
against the generation. We can see that Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 possess the same
trend and have the optimal point at the same time. In addition, for the first 25 years,
as there is no payout happens, the expected asset share is always increasing, which
helps generate a higher bonus rate. The reason that the optimal point appears before
the asset share achieve the optimal point at the end of 25 years just before giving
out the payout. The reason to this earlier optimal point is because the expected
bonus rates between the 23rd generation and the 25th generation are larger than
the equilibrium payout, which can be observed from Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.1: Expected terminal payout over asset share against generations. µ = 0.08,
r = 0.02, σ = 0.2, N = 25, P = 1, δ = 0.8.
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Figure 3.2: Expected terminal guaranteed amount against generations. µ = 0.08,
r = 0.02, σ = 0.2, N = 25, P = 1, δ = 0.8.
Figure 3.3: Expected bonus rate against years. µ = 0.08, r = 0.02, σ = 0.2, N = 25,
P = 1, δ = 0.8.
Based on the model we used above, we can see that a return distribution from
early generations to later generations. This is because later generation are more
likely to share a larger portion of the bonus.
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3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we analyse an interesting with-profits product in detail. The closed
form solution for the fair pricing of this contract is obtained under the Black-Scholes
model. Our result shows that the insurer undervalues this contract owing to the free
embedded guarantees. Specifically, for a 0% annual guarantee, the contract worths
7% more than the price charged by the insurer. With the increase of the guarantee
rate, the value of the contract is even higher.
More importantly, due to the return smoothing method depends on the return
before the term of the contract, a special risk regarding to the speculating entry to
this contract exposes the insurer to an unhedgeable risk. We also provide a closed
form formula for the fair pricing of this unhedgeable risk, which increase the value
of this contract by another 5%. In order to show how to make this contract a fair
contract, we propose a solution by how to charge an annual management fee.
In the last part of this chapter, we study the inter-generation effect for this
contract. We study the expected payoff for 50 generations by using a numerical
simulation method. Based on the bonus distribution rule we assumed, there is a
return distribution from early generations to later generations. This is because the
early generations build up a reserve which is beneficial to the later generations.
Further extension to this chapter could be using a more realistic model, stochas-
tic interest rate and stock return, to price this with-profits contract. As the inde-
pendent returns is a strong assumptions, a correlated returns asset model maybe
more realistic to the practice. In addition, with-profits policyholders share the same
reserve, it is interesting to know if this joint product is better than an individual
product.
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A comparison of smoothing
methods in with-profits products
4.1 Introduction
Guarantees or options embedded products have become less popular in the market
recently because its bad reputation of complex valuation and leading to enormous
insolvency problems (see Guille´n et al. 2006; Gatzert and Schmeiser 2013). Without
the provision of guarantees and bonuses, a with-profits contract works like a mutual
fund. A feature distinguishes it from the mutual fund is the smoothing which is
used to smooth the extreme ups and downs of the markets. An example of how the
smoothing method works is illustrated in Figure 4.1. We can see from the figure
that the insurer holds back some gains when the market performs well and pays out
the held back gains when the market performs poorly.
Recently, some traditional with-profits contracts providers launch the pension
products with smoothing only and stop issuing free guarantees to the policyholders.
Without the embedded guarantees and the possible bonuses, the customers receive a
smoothed payout at the maturity date, which is only determined by the smoothing
method. Different smoothing methods tend to give different terminal payouts.
There are many papers studying with-profits contracts. Only a few of them
touch on the topic of smoothing mechanism. They mainly study the smoothing
mechanism in terms of pricing. See Haberman et al. (2003), Guille´n et al. (2006) and
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Figure 4.1: Example path of smoothed fund value by using the bandwidth smoothing
method.
Løchte Jørgensen (2007). The aim of smoothing is expecting the value of customers’
investment could cancel itself out over the long term to avoid short term fluctuations.
To our best knowledge, no one has examined the effects of smoothing methods before.
It is interesting and also important to know how the smoothing method per-
forms and if it is able to give a fair payout to the customers. The fairness here has
a different definition from previous chapters. It is defined as the expected value of
the smoothed payout equals the actual investment value. Specifically, in this chap-
ter, we analyses three smoothing methods of with-profits contracts applied in the
UK and discuss to what extent the smoothing reduce the variations of the policy-
holder’s benefit. In addition, we use Multi-Cumulative Prospect Theory (MCPT)
to calculate the interim utility in order to measure the smoothing effects year by
year.
4.2 Smoothing methods
In this part, we introduce three smoothing methods which are used by UK life and
pension companies: the geometric average method, the weighted sum method and
the bandwidth method. Before giving the details of each method, some assumptions
of the pension contract are introduced first.
The pension contract is assumed as a one-off premium contract. The premium
P is paid at start and then invested in an investment fund by the insurer. The rate
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of return of the investment fund in year n is denoted as Rn ∈ R. As the expenses
are not considered in this chapter, the actual value of the fund An in each year n is
the underlying value of policyholder’s investment. Mathematically,
An =
 P, n = 0An−1(1 +Rn), n ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..., N}. (4.1)
The term of this contract isN years. At the maturity timeN , instead of receiving the
actual fund value, the policyholder receives a smoothed fund value as the terminal
payout. The calculation of the smoothed fund value of each smoothing method are
given in the following.
4.2.1 Geometric average (GA) smoothing method
The first smoothing method we introduce is the geometric average (GA) method. By
using the GA smoothing method, the smoothed fund value increases at a smoothed
return which is a geometric mean of five annual returns of the underlying fund 1.
Haberman et al. (2003) introduces a with-profits policy whose annual increase rate
is based on the geometric return in the last four years.
The smoothing method we study here is different. The smoothed return de-
pends not only on the returns in the past but also on the estimated returns in the
future. Specifically, the smoothed return for year n is calculated as
RGAn = [(1 +Rn−2)(1 +Rn−1)(1 +Rn)(1 +Rn+1)(1 +Rn+2)]
1
5 − 1 (4.2)
where Rn−2, Rn−1, Rn are the realised returns of the underlying investment fund in
each of the previous two years and the current year, respectively. Rn+1 and Rn+2
are the annual returns in each of the next two years.
It is important to point out that these two returns, Rn+1 and Rn+2 are not
known in year n. That is to say, the smoothed return RGAn is Fn+2 measurable,
where Fn+2 is the information available up to time n + 2. Thus, when calculating
1This 5-year geometric average smoothing method is specified in insurer’s product booklet.
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the smoothed fund value at the end of year n, the insurer needs to estimate these
two future returns. The estimated return, or the expected growth rate (EGR) in
practice, nR
∗
n+i ∈ R for i = 1, 2 is the insurer’s best estimate return of the next
two years given all the available information up to time n. When time progresses
to the end of year n + 1, the actual return in year n + 1 is known. Then the EGR
nR
∗
n+1 estimated in year n used to calculate the smoothed return R
GA
n is updated
by the responding actual return over year n+ 1. Similarly, the future return in year
n + 2 will be updated by its realised value when it is known at time n + 2. The
mathematical formulae to express the smoothed return over year n calculating at
different times are given as:
Calculating at time n,
nR
GA
n = [(1 +Rn−2)(1 +Rn−1)(1 +Rn)(1 + nR
∗
n+i)(1 + nR
∗
n+2)]
1
5 − 1 (4.3)
Calculating at time n+ 1,
n+1R
GA
n = [(1 +Rn−2)(1 +Rn−1)(1 +Rn)(1 +Rn+1)(1 + n+1R
∗
n+2)]
1
5 − 1
(4.4)
Calculating at time n+ i where i ≥ 2,
n+iR
GA
n = R
GA
n
= [(1 +Rn−2)(1 +Rn−1)(1 +Rn)(1 +Rn+1)(1 +Rn+2)]
1
5 − 1 (4.5)
The smoothed value of customer’s payout using GA method is calculated explicitly
as:
AGAn = PΠ
n
k=1(1 + nR
GA
k ) (4.6)
The distribution of the smoothed return RGAn , has a lower variance than the
variance of the actual returns, as it is a geometric average of those returns. For
example, if 1 + Rn+k ∼ logN(µ, σ2) for k = −2,−1, 0, 1, 2 and Rn−2, Rn−1, ..., Rn+2
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are independent random variables, then 1 + RGAn ∼ logN(µ, 15σ2). The volatility
parameter of RGAn is a fifth of σ
2 and in the sense it is a smoothed investment
return.
4.2.2 Weigthed sum (WS) smoothing method
Under the weighted sum (WS) method, the smoothed fund value AWSn in year n
is the weighted average of the actual fund value An in year n and the previous
smoothed fund value AWSn−1 accumulated at an expected growth rate (EGR) in year
n but published at time n− 1, n−1R∗n. That is to say:
AWSn =
 P, n = 0AWSn−1(1 + n−1R∗n)κ+ An(1− κ), n ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..., N}, (4.7)
where κ ∈ [0, 1] is a constant smoothing factor. After recursive substitution of
Equation (4.7), the smoothed fund value becomes
AWSn = Pκ
n
n∏
i=1
(1 + i−1R∗i ) + P (1− κ)
n∑
j=1
κn−j
n∏
i=j+1
(1 + i−1R∗i )Π
j
i=1(1 +Ri)
(4.8)
It is observed that when κ = 0, AWSn = An. That is to say, no smoothing works in
this case. While κ = 1, AWSn = P
∏n
i=1(1+ i−1R
∗
i ), the policyholder’s smoothed fund
value only increases at the expected growth rate.
4.2.3 Bandwidth (BW) smoothing method
The last method we introduce is called the bandwidth (BW) smoothing method. In
this method, each year the smoothed fund value increases at the expected growth
rate which is set by the insurer. At the end of each year, the insurer monitors the
percentage gap between the smoothed fund value and the actual underlying fund
value, which is calculated by dividing the difference between these two values by the
smoothed fund value. If the percentage gap is more than 5%2, the smoothed fund
2This 5 % band is specified in insurer’s product booklet.
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Figure 4.2: Example of bandwidth smoothing method.
value is adjusted by reducing the difference in value by half, repeatedly, until the
percentage gap is less than 5%.
An example of how the smoothing method works is given in Figure 4.2.3 When
the smoothed price is 100 pence and the unsmoothed price is 94 pence, a difference
of 6 pence suggests the percentage gap is 6% (> 5%). The insurer reduces the
smoothed fund value to 97 pence, since halving the original value difference of 6
pence implies that the new smoothed price is 97 pence. When the smoothed price is
100 pence and the unsmoothed price is 108 pence, the percentage gap is 8% (> 5%).
Now the value difference should be narrowed to 4 pence by increasing the smoothed
price to 104 pence.
It is important to note that this updating procedure could be done more than
once if necessary, until the percentage gap is less than 5%. For example, suppose
the original smoothed fund value is 100. If the actual fund value is 124, the gap is
24%. In this case, we need to reduce the gap three times to let the gap be smaller
than 5%. At the first time, the difference is reduced from 24 to 12. But the new
percentage gap is still larger than 5%. Then the difference should be reduced twice
more, that is from 12 to 6 and from 6 to 3. Now the gap is 124
124−3 − 1 = 2.47%, in
which case the gap satisfies the 5% restriction.
3Market parameters are referred from Guille´n et al. (2006).
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4.3 The fairness of the smoothing methods under
geometric Brownian motion
In this part, we discuss if the three smoothing mechanisms give policyholders a
fair payout. As the smoothing is carried out under the real world measure, in this
part, our aim is to examine if the expected smoothed terminal fund value for each
smoothing method is the same as the expected terminal value of the underlying
investment. That is
E[AχN |Fn] = E[AN |Fn] for χ ∈ {GA,WS,BW}. (4.9)
4.3.1 Market Model
In order to focus on comparing the smoothing effects, no expense, mortality and
lapse are taken into account here. A geometric Brownian motion is assumed for the
actual fund value S as S0 = sdSt = µStdt+ σStdW Pt . (4.10)
where the expected increase rate µ, and volatility σ are positive constants. W P is a
Wiener process defined on the filtered probability space (Ω,F, (Ft),P) on the finite
interval [0, T ]. Then the return Rn in year n is
Rn =
Sn
Sn−1
= exp [µ− 1
2
σ2 + σ(W Pn −W Pn−1)]−1 for n = 1, 2, 3, ..., N. (4.11)
4.3.2 GA method
It is known that the smoothed fund value of GA method increases at the geometric
mean of five years’ worth of returns. Let Yn = 1+Rn, then {Yn}Nn=1 are independent
copies of a log-normal distributed random variable Y . In the following, we derive
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the expected value of the smoothed payout at each time n ≤ N where N ≥ 7 4 given
the information up to N . For simplicity, we let the single premium P = 1. Then
the expected fund value at the end of year 1 is
E[AGA1 |FN ] =E[(1 + NRGA1 )] = E
[
[(Y−1)(Y0)(Y1)(Y2)(Y3)]
1
5
]
=E[Y
1
5 ]5. (4.12)
Similarly, for year 2 to 4, we have
E[AGA2 |FN ] =E[(1 + NRGA1 )(1 + NRGA2 )]
=E
[
[(Y−1)(Y0)(Y1)(Y2)(Y3)]
1
5 [(Y0)(Y1)(Y2)(Y3)(Y4)]
1
5
]
=E
[
(Y−1)
1
5 [(Y0)(Y1)(Y2)(Y3)]
2
5 (Y4)
1
5 ]
]
=E[Y
1
5 ]2E[Y
2
5 ]4. (4.13)
E[AGA3 |FN ] =E[(1 + NRGA1 )(1 + NRGA2 )(1 + NRGA3 )]
=E
[
(Y−1)
1
5 (Y0)
2
5 [(Y1)(Y2)(Y3)]
3
5 (Y4)
2
5 (Y5)
1
5 ]
]
=E[Y
1
5 ]2E[Y
2
5 ]2E[Y
3
5 ]3. (4.14)
E[AGA4 |FN ] =E[(1 + NRGA1 )(1 + NRGA2 )(1 + NRGA3 )(1 + NRGA4 )]
=E
[
(Y−1)
1
5 (Y0)
2
5 (Y1)
3
5 (Y2)
4
5 (Y3)
4
5 (Y4)
3
5 (Y5)
2
5 (Y6)
1
5 ]
]
=E[Y
1
5 ]2E[Y
2
5 ]2E[Y
3
5 ]2E[Y
4
5 ]2. (4.15)
4In order to allow the smoothing method fully work, the maturity of this contract should
be larger than 7 years. Additionally, it is reasonable to assume that a pension contract has an
investment horizon longer than 7 years.
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For the expected smoothed payout from year 5 to year N − 2,
E[AGAn |FN ] =E[(1 + NRGA1 )(1 + NRGA2 ) · · · (1 + NRGAn )]
=E
[
[(Y−1)(Y0)(Y1)(Y2)(Y3)]
1
5 · · ·
[(Yn−2)(Yn−1)(Yn)(Yn+1)(Yn+2)]
1
5
]
=E[Y
1
5 ]2E[Y
2
5 ]2E[Y
3
5 ]2E[Y
4
5 ]2E[Y ]n−4. (4.16)
For the calculation of the expected returns of the smoothed fund value in years N−1
and N , we need to use estimated returns in the future. As we focus on the smoothing
effects, in this chapter, it is assumed the insurer makes good estimation about the
future returns in which case the estimated returns are equal to the expected return
of the underlying fund, i.e., NR
∗
N+1 = NR
∗
N+2 = exp (µ)− 1. Then
E[AGAN−1|FN ] =E[(1 + NRGA1 )(1 + NRGA2 ) · · · (1 +RGAN−1)|FN ]
=E
[
[(Y−1)(Y0)(Y1)(Y2)(Y3)]
1
5 · · ·
[(YN−3)(YN−2)(YN−1)(YN) exp (µ)]
1
5
]
=E[Y
1
5 ]E[Y
2
5 ]2E[Y
3
5 ]2E[Y
4
5 ]2E[Y ]N−5 exp (
µ
5
) (4.17)
E[AGAN |FN ] =E[(1 + NRGA1 )(1 + NRGA2 ) · · · (1 + NRGAN−1)(1 + NRGAN )|FN ]
=E
[
[(Y−1)(Y0)(Y1)(Y2)(Y3)]
1
5 · · · [(YN−2)(YN−1)(YN) exp (2µ)] 15
]
,
(4.18)
i.e.,
E[AGAN |FN ] = E[Y
1
5 ]E[Y
2
5 ]E[Y
3
5 ]2E[Y
4
5 ]2E[Y ]N−4 exp (
3µ
5
) (4.19)
From Jensen’s inequality, we know that
E[Y p] < (E[Y ])p for 0 < p < 1. (4.20)
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Then the expected terminal fund value
E[AGAN |FN ] < (E[Y ])
1
5 (E[Y ])
2
5 (E[Y ])
6
5 (E[Y ])
8
5 (E[Y ])N−4 exp (
3µ
5
)
= (E[Y ])N = E[AN |FN ]. (4.21)
That is to say,
E[AGAN |FN ] < E[AN |FN ] a.s. (4.22)
We have shown that the expected terminal value of the smoothed fund value is
smaller than the unsmoothed one. Thus, the GA smoothing mechanism is not fair
for the policyholder. So far, the properties of the distribution of Y haven’t been
used yet. In other words, this result holds for any distribution of Y as long as annual
investment returns are independent.
Equation (4.21) shows the expected value of GA smoothed payout is the prod-
uct of a series of moments of the random variable Y . As Y is a log-normal ran-
dom variable with location parameter (µ − 1
2
σ2) and scale parameter σ, i.e., Y ∼
logN(µ − 1
2
σ2, σ2), we are able to give the analytic formula of the expected value
of the smoothed payout for the GA method. From the properties of log-normal
distribution, we know that for k = 1, 2, ..., 5,
E[Y
k
5 ] = exp (
k
5
(µ− 1
2
v2) +
1
2
(
k
5
)2v2) = exp (
k
5
µ+
k2 − 5k
50
v2). (4.23)
Substituting Equation (4.23) into Equation (4.21) gives
E[AGAN |FN ] =E[Y
1
5 ]E[Y
2
5 ]E[Y
3
5 ]2E[Y
4
5 ]2E[Y ]N−4 exp (
3µ
5
) (4.24)
= exp (Nµ− 3
5
v2).
In order to have a deeper understanding why the expected terminal value of the
smoothed fund is less than the actual one, we calculate the annual increase rate5
5This is not the same as the expected return of the smoothed fund value E[RGAk |Fn] in year n.
The reason why we use the expected increase rate is we cannot see the dependence effect from the
expected smoothed return in year n.
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In of the expected value of the smoothed fund in each year n by using the result of
Equation (4.23). For year 1, as the single premium P = 1,
1 + IGA1 =
E[AGA1 |FN ]
P
=
E[Y
1
5 ]5
1
= exp(µ− 2
5
v2) < exp(µ). (4.25)
In year 2,
1 + IGA2 =
E[AGA2 |FN ]
E[AGA1 |FN ]
=
E[Y
2
5 ]4
E[Y
1
5 ]3
= exp(µ− 6
25
v2) < exp(µ). (4.26)
For year 3,
1 + IGA3 =
E[AGA3 |FN ]
E[AGA2 |FN ]
=
E[Y
3
5 ]3
E[Y
2
5 ]2
= exp(µ− 3
25
v2) < exp(µ). (4.27)
In year 4,
1 + IGA4 =
E[AGA4 |FN ]
E[AGA3 |FN ]
=
E[Y
4
5 ]2
E[Y
3
5 ]1
= exp(µ− 1
25
v2) < exp(µ). (4.28)
For year i = (5, 6, ..., N − 2),
1 + IGAi =
E[AGAi |FN ]
E[AGAi−1|FN ]
= exp(µ). (4.29)
In year N − 1, the estimated underlying fund return is the expected return µ. Then
1 + IGAN−1 =
E[AGAN−1|FN ]
E[AGAN−2|FN ]
= E[Y ]
exp (µ
5
)
E[Y
1
5 ]
= exp (µ+
2
25
v2) > exp(µ). (4.30)
For the last year, we have
1 + IGAN =
E[AGAN |FN ]
E[AGAN−1|FN ]
= E[Y ]
exp (2r
5
)
E[Y
2
5 ]
= exp (µ+
3
25
v2) > exp(µ). (4.31)
A numerical result for the increase rate of the expected value of GA method
E[AGAn |FN ]
E[AGAn−1|FN ]
in year n ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} is presented in Figure 4.3. For the first four
years, the increase rates are lower than the expected return while the increase rate
in the last two years are higher. The numerical result supports the results of our
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mathematical derivation above.
Figure 4.3: The increase rate of the expected value of the smoothed fund using GA
method against the expected return of the actual fund value. µ = 0.065, σ = 0.15,
N = 20, P = 1.
For the GA method, the smoothing parameter is the length of the smoothing
window (in practice it is 5 years). The effects of different smoothing windows on
the value of the GA method is given in Table 4.1. The result shows the shorter the
smoothing window, the higher the smoothed fund value and the closer to the actual
fund value. When the smoothing window narrows down to 1 year, no smoothing
exist. In this case, the expected smoothed fund value is just the actual fund value.
Smoothing window (in years) GA smoothed value
9 3.5781
7 3.5947
5 3.6195
3 3.6386
1 (no smoothing) 3.6670
Table 4.1: The effects of different smoothing windows on the expected terminal
value under the GA method. µ = 0.065, σ = 0.15, N = 20, P = 1.
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4.3.3 WS method
Recall that the WS smoothing mechanism works as:
AWSn =
 P, n = 0AWSn−1(1 + n−1R∗n)κ+ An(1− κ), n ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..., N}. (4.32)
As we focus on the smoothing effects, we assume the expected growth rate n−1R∗n
equals the expected return exp (µ)− 1, consistent with the assumptions in the pre-
vious section. For easier notation, let µ′ = exp (µ)− 1 denote the discrete expected
return. Then the smoothed fund value becomes
AWSn =
 P, n = 0AWSn−1(1 + µ′)κ+ An(1− κ), n ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..., N}. (4.33)
After recursive substitution of Equation (4.33), we get
AWSN = Pκ
N(1 + µ′)N + (1− κ)
N∑
i=1
P
i∏
j=1
(1 +Rj)κ
N−i(1 + µ′)N−i. (4.34)
Then the expected terminal value of the smoothed fund value ASWSN for a smoothing
factor κ ∈ [0, 1] is
E[AWSN |FN ] = PκN(1 + µ′)N + P (1− κ)
N∑
i=1
i∏
j=1
E[(1 +Rj)]κ
N−i(1 + µ′)N−i
= PκN(1 + µ′)N + P (1− κ)
N∑
i=1
(1 + µ′)iκN−i(1 + µ′)N−i
= PκN(1 + µ′)N + P (1− κ)(1 + µ′)N 1− κ
N
1− κ
= P (1 + µ′)N . (4.35)
Thus
E[AN |FN ] = E[P
N∏
n=1
Yn] = P
N∏
n=1
E[Yn] = P (1 + µ
′)N = E[AWSN |FN ], (4.36)
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and we conclude that the WS smoothing mechanism is fair for both policyholders
and insurance companies. The fairness result is not affected by the value of the
smoothing factor κ.
4.3.4 BW Method
By using the bandwidth smoothing method, the insurer monitors the gap between
the value of the actual fund value and the smoothed fund value. If the gap is more
than 5% of the smoothed fund value, the difference is repeatedly reduced by half
until the gap is less than 5%. Specifically, if the percentage gap is between 10% and
20% (upside or downside), two reductions are needed. For the gap within the range
of 20% and 40% (upside or downside), three reductions are required. If the gap is
larger than 40% and smaller than 80% (upside or downside), the smoothed value
should be updated four times.
Figure 4.4 shows how the smoothed value changes against the actual fund value.
It is observed that this smoothing method generates a non-linear smoothing effect.
In addition, Figure 4.5 compares the new and original smoothed fund value by fixing
the actual fund value to 100. The result shows that a bigger difference between the
actual fund value and the smoothed fund value may lead to a smaller difference after
the smoothing, which also suggests a non-linear smoothing effect.
The smoothed fund value at maturity time N is denoted by ABWN for the BW
method. Because of the highly complicated, non-linear smoothing method, we are
not able to give an analytic formula for the price of a contract using the BW method.
However, we are able to approximate the solution for a one year contract ABW1 .
Under the real world measure P, the actual fund value is expected to accumulate at
the expected return µ. As before, the expected growth rate is assumed to be this
expected return.
Figure 4.6 shows the histogram of the 1 year percentage gap between the actual
fund value and the smoothed fund value when the underlying asset price follows the
geometric Brownian motion. We notice that the probability of the gap larger than
40% (upside or downside) in one year is relatively small. Thus, we could treat the
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Figure 4.4: The smoothed fund value changes with actual fund value, when the
original fund value equals 100.
Figure 4.5: The smoothed fund value changes with the original smoothed fund value,
when the actual fund value equals to 100.
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Figure 4.6: The histogram of the percentage gap based on the Monte Carlo
simulation for a 1 year contract, under the BW method. The parameters are
µ = 0.065 and σ = 0.15.
scenarios in which the gap is larger than 40% as if they fell in the scenario with gap
between 20% and 40%. By using the above approximation, we underestimate the
value of the upside gap and overestimate the downside gap. As the probability of
scenarios with downside gap bigger than 40% is much smaller than the upside gap.
the difference between the smoothed fund value and the actual fund value mainly
comes from the upside gap. Thus, the approximated value E[ABW
∗
1 ] is lower than
the true value E[ABW1 ] due to the underestimation of the upside.
Specifically, we are able to approximate the expected price of this contract by
82
Chapter 4: A comparison of smoothing methods in with-profits products
considering 7 cases listed in equation (4.37),
ABW
∗
1 =

A1 − 18 [A1 − Peµ] = 78A1 + 18Peµ, for A1 ∈ (1.2Peµ,+∞)
A1 − 14 [A1 − Peµ] = 34A1 + 14Peµ, for A1 ∈ (1.1Peµ, 1.2Peµ]
A1 − 12 [A1 − Peµ] = 12A1 + 12Peµ, for A1 ∈ (1.05Peµ, 1.1Peµ]
Peµ, for A1 ∈ (0.95Peµ, 1.05Peµ]
A1 +
1
2
[Peµ − A1] = 12A1 + 12Peµ, for A1 ∈ (0.9Peµ, 0.95Peµ]
A1 +
1
4
[Peµ − A1] = 34A1 + 14Peµ, for A1 ∈ (0.8Peµ, 0.9Peµ]
A1 +
1
8
[Peµ − A1] = 78A1 + 18Peµ, for A1 ∈ (0, 0.8Peµ].
(4.37)
For the first case of equation (4.37), the expected value is given as
E[
7
8
A1 +
1
8
Peµ|A1 > 1.2Peµ]
=
7
8
E[A1|A1 > 1.2Peµ] + 1
8
PeµE[A1 > 1.2Pe
µ]
=
7
8
∫
A1>1.2Peµ
Pe(µ−
1
2
σ2+σy)f(y)dy +
1
8
∫
A1>1.2Peµ
Peµf(y)dy
=
7
8
Peµ
∫
y>
ln(1.2)
σ
+ 1
2
σ
e(−
1
2
σ2+σy) 1√
2pi
e(−
1
2
)y2dy +
1
8
Peµ
∫
y>
ln(1.2)
σ
+ 1
2
σ
f(y)dy
=
7
8
Peµ
∫
y>
ln(1.2)
σ
+ 1
2
σ
1√
2pi
e(−
1
2
)(y−σ)2dy +
1
8
Peµ
∫
y>
ln(1.2)
σ
+ 1
2
σ
f(y)dy
Let z = y − σ, we have
=
7
8
Peµ
∫
z>
ln(1.2)
σ
− 1
2
σ
1√
2pi
e(−
1
2
)(z)2dz +
1
8
Peµ
∫
y>
ln(1.2)
σ
+ 1
2
σ
f(y)dy
=
7
8
PeµΦ(
− ln(1.2)
σ
+
1
2
σ) +
1
8
PeµΦ(
− ln(1.2)
σ
− 1
2
σ) (4.38)
Similarly, we are able to write the expression for the other cases. Summing all the
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cases gives the solution to a one year contract, i.e.,
E[ABW1 ] > E[A
BW ∗
1 ]
=Peµ
(
7
8
Φ(
− ln(1.2)
σ
+
1
2
σ) +
3
4
(Φ(
− ln(1.1)
σ
+
1
2
σ)− Φ(− ln(1.2)
σ
+
1
2
σ))
+
1
2
(Φ(
− ln(1.05)
σ
+
1
2
σ)− Φ(− ln(1.1)
σ
+
1
2
σ))
+
1
2
(Φ(
− ln(0.9)
σ
+
1
2
σ)− Φ(− ln(0.95)
σ
+
1
2
σ))
+
3
4
(Φ(
− ln(0.8)
σ
+
1
2
σ)− Φ(− ln(0.9)
σ
+
1
2
σ))
+
7
8
Φ(
ln(0.8)
σ
− 1
2
σ)
+
1
8
Φ(
− ln(1.2)
σ
− 1
2
σ) +
1
4
(Φ(
− ln(1.1)
σ
− 1
2
σ)− Φ(− ln(1.2)
σ
− 1
2
σ))
+
1
2
(Φ(
− ln(1.05)
σ
− 1
2
σ)− Φ(− ln(1.1)
σ
− 1
2
σ))
+ Φ(
− ln(0.9)
σ
− 1
2
σ)− Φ(− ln(1.05)
σ
− 1
2
σ)
+
1
2
(Φ(
− ln(0.9)
σ
− 1
2
σ)− Φ(− ln(0.95)
σ
− 1
2
σ))
+
1
4
(Φ(
− ln(0.8)
σ
− 1
2
σ)− Φ(− ln(0.9)
σ
− 1
2
σ))
+
1
8
Φ(
ln(0.8)
σ
+
1
2
σ)
)
(4.39)
After substituting the value of µ and σ into the equation (4.39), we find out that
E[ABW1 ] > E[A
BW ∗
1 ] > E[A1]. (4.40)
In the above, we gave an approximated solution to a one year contract. However,
for a N year contract, numerical method should be used to calculate the price. Our
result shows BW method always gives a slightly higher payout than the unsmoothed
payout. As the difference is small, we plot the difference between the expected value
using BW smoothing method and the unsmoothed value , E[ABWn ]− E[An], at the
end of each year n in the Figure 4.7.
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Figure 4.7: The difference between the expected value using BW smoothing method
and the unsmoothed value , E[ABWn ] − E[An]. The parameters are µ = 0.065,
σ = 0.15, N = 20, P = 1.
4.4 Further analysis of the smoothing methods
In the previous section, we have shown that, under the Black-Scholes world, the
geometric average (GA) method overvalues the contract, the bandwidth (BW) un-
dervalues the contract and the weighted sum (WS) method gives a fair payout to the
customers. The Black-Scholes model assumes the returns in each year are indepen-
dent, but this is not consistent with previous empirical studies. For example, Fama
and French (1988) studies all New York Stock Exchange stocks data from 1926 to
1985 and show that a negative auto-correlation is observed for longer horizons (2
to 5 years). Poterba and Summers (1988) did a similar empirical study in another
17 countries and conclude the same result. On the other hand, Lo and MacKinlay
(1988) and Lo and MacKinlay (1990) find out the returns of equity portfolio are typ-
ically positively auto-correlated for short horizons. Grundy (1991) and Cont (2001)
use more recent data and provide consistent evidence for positively auto-correlated
returns at short horizons. Thus, it is interesting to know what happens in a financial
market model when investment returns are dependent.
In the following, we follow Lo and Wang (1995) to use the bivariate trend-
ing Ornstein-Uhlenbeck(OU) process, which considers both the short-term positive
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auto-correlation and the long term reversal, to model the price of the underlying
fund. In addition, an analytical result of the fairness for GA method under auto-
regress AR(1) has been given in Appendix (4.6).
4.4.1 Trending Bivariate Ornstein-Uhlenbeck(OU) model
In order to study correlated returns in financial market, Lo and Wang (1995) propose
the bivariate trending Ornstein-Uhlenbeck(OU) process to model the price of the
underlying asset, which is defined as

dSt =
(
µ− κ( log St
S0
− (µ− 1
2
σ2)t
)
+ λHt
)
Stdt+ σStdW
(s)
t ,
dHt = −δHtdt+ σxdW (h)t ,
S0 = s,H0 = h,
(4.41)
where W
(s)
t and W
(h)
t are two independent standard Brownian motions. The process
Ht is not observable and is used to make the long term mean of the underlying
return process more flexible. κ ≥ 0 and δ ≥ 0 are the mean reverting parameters
of processes St and Ht, respectively. This is more straightforward if we let the
de-trended return qt = logSt − (µ− 12σ2)t, then Equation (4.41) becomes
dqt = κ
(
(q0 +
λ
κ
Ht)− qt
)
dt+ σdW
(s)
t ,
dHt = −δHtdt+ σhdW (h)t ,
q0 = log s,H0 = h.
(4.42)
In the following, we present the numerical result of the smoothed terminal value
of each smoothing methods by assuming the underlying fund follows the bi-variate
trending OU process. For comparison, the geometric process is also used to model
the underlying fund price process. The parameters of the above processes given in
Table 4.2 are referenced from the calibration result of Thierfelder (2015) which is
based on 20 years data of FTSE 100.
Table 4.3 shows that when the underlying fund value follows both the geometric
Brownian motion and the Bi-variate trending OU process, the GA method generates
a smaller payout than the actual fund value. The BW method gives a slightly
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Price Process µ κ δ σ σh λ
BiVar Trend 0.09 3.75 1.81 0.154 1.2 1
GBM 0.09 - - 0.183 - -
Table 4.2: Parameters for the processes of underlying fund price.
BiVar Trend Actual GA WS BW
mean of terminal value 6.186 6.105 6.186 6.199
variance of terminal value 1.77 0.70 1.25 1.58
GBM Actual GA WS BW
mean of terminal value 6.051 5.931 6.050 6.064
variance of terminal value 35.02 29.55 31.17 34.29
Table 4.3: Mean and variance of the terminal payout of a 20 years contract from
different smoothing methods.
higher payout. Under both cases, the WS method tend to give a fair payout to the
customers.
4.4.2 Smoothing effects
In the previous section, we only compare the terminal value of three smoothing
methods. However, as the insurance companies and pension funds generally sends
annual statement of the pension portfolios to their customers at the end of each year,
Bellemare et al. (2005) suggest that such interim information affects the customers’
behaviours. In addition, Benartzi and Thaler (1995) provides evidence that long-
term investors choose their investment strategies based on short evaluation horizons.
Furthermore, Arkes et al. (2008) show that investors tend to adjust their reference
point within the period of the investment. As the aim of smoothing is to smooth out
the short term fluctuation of the fund value over the long-term, it is not reasonable to
neglect the short-term performance of the smoothing method. Thus, in this section,
we follow Ruß and Schelling (2018) and use the Multi Cumulative Prospect Theory
(MCPT) to evaluate the short-term performance of different smoothing methods.
In CPT, an investment or a prospect f is expressed as
f = (e−m, p−m; e−m+1, p−m+1; ...; e0, p0; ...; en−1, pn−1; en, pn; )
87
Chapter 4: A comparison of smoothing methods in with-profits products
with possible outcomes ei and the corresponding probabilities pi. The outcomes are
compared against a reference point (usually the initial value of investment A0, or
the premium P ) and arranged in ascending order in terms of the payout value. CPT
values gains and loss separately. Let dt = ei−A0 denote the payout for each possible
outcome. Then the CPT utility of an investment is the sum of utility of positive
prospect f+ and negative prospect f−, or i.e.,
V (f) = V (f+) + V (f−) =
n∑
i=0
pi+i v(di) +
0∑
i=−m
pi−i v(di) (4.43)
where v is the value function and pii is the decision weights associated with payout
di. The decision weight pi is a subjective probability which is calculated as the first
order difference of the cumulative weighting function:
pi+i = w(pi + ...+ pn)− w(pi+1 + ...+ pn), 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1; (4.44)
pi−i = w(p−m + ...+ pi)− (p−m + ...+ pi−1), 1−m ≤ i ≤ 0; (4.45)
pi+n = w(pn); (4.46)
pi−−m = w(p−m). (4.47)
Value function v(x) shows how people value things (like gambling or invest-
ment). It is monotonically increasing. A positive outcome suggests a positive utility
value while negative outcome leads to a negative utility value. The value function
is concave in the positive part and convex in the negative part. The curvature for
losses is steeper than for gains.
Weighting function presents how people deal with the probabilities. It does not
have a linear relationship with the real probability, as it overweight small probability
and underweight large probabilities.
Ruß and Schelling (2018)’s MCPT is an extension of CPT by taking into ac-
count multiple reference points and comparison horizons in calculating customers’
subjective utility. For an investment A, the customer is assumed to evaluate the
portfolio at the end of each year. In this sense, the reference point in each year is
naturally the value of the portfolio last year.
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Let Dt = At−At−1 denote the value change of the investor’s investment in year
t, then the MCPT interim utility of an investment A for investment horizon T ∈ Z+
is given by
MCPT (A) :=
T∑
t=1
V (Dt). (4.48)
The total utility of an investment is a linear combination of the interim utility and
the terminal utility. That is,
CPT com(A) = sMCPT (A) + (1− s)V (D), (4.49)
where D = AT − A0 is the difference between the terminal value and the initial
investment and s controls the influence from interim utility on the total utility.
Below, we present the numerical result of the MCPT utility for each smoothing
method. The controlling factor s is chosen to be 0.5 by following Ruß and Schelling
(2018). In addition, the value function, weighting function and the parameters used
in this section are taken from Ruß and Schelling (2018). Specifically, the value
function is
v(d) =
 d
α if d ≥ 0
−λ(−d)β if d < 0,
(4.50)
where λ = 2.25 and α = β = 0.88.
The weighting function w rescales the probabilities and satisfies w(0) = 0 and
w(1) = 1.
w(p) =
pγ
(pγ + (1− p)γ) 1γ
(4.51)
where γ = 0.65.
Table 4.4 shows the total utility which combines the interim utility and the
terminal utility of the investment following each smoothing method. The results
suggest that the GA method gives the customers the highest utility. WS method
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BiVar Trend Actual GA WS BW
CPT com 1.0667 5.3651 3.9640 2.0974
GBM Actual GA WS BW
CPT com 0.7253 3.5081 2.8066 1.4830
Table 4.4: Combined utility of the terminal payout of a 20 years contract for different
smoothing methods.
and BW method generates the second highest and the third highest utility. The
underlying investment has the least utility, which arises from its high variance.
4.5 Conclusion
Return smoothing method is an important feature of traditional pension contract.
By using a smoothing method, The insurers is able to keep some profit in good
years and give it back to the customers when the market performs poorly. As the
smoothing method provides the customer a more stable return by time diversification
and risk sharing, it is believed to be a virtue of it. In this chapter, we carefully
compare three smoothing methods, geometric average (GA) method, weighted sum
(WS) method and the Bandwidth (BW) method, which are still used in with-profits
contracts nowadays.
We first examine if each smoothing method provide a equitable payout for
each policyholders. By assuming the underlying investment fund follows the classic
geometric Brownian motion, our results indicate that the GA smoothing mechanism
underpays the customer while the BW method overpays the customer. The WS
smoothing mechanism generates a fair payout. Empirical evidence shows that the
annual investment returns are not independent. In order to identify if these result
still hold when the returns are correlated, we use a more realistic model, the trending
bivariate OU model, to model the asset returns and our finding supports the previous
result.
We not only care about the fairness of the terminal value, but also interest in
the utility generated by each smoothing methods to the customers. Especially, we
take into account the interim utility in this chapter. Each year, the policyholders
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should receive an annual update about the performance of their investment. Thus,
we believe the interim utility is also important part of the customers’ overall utility.
Specifically, Multi-Cumulative Prospect Theory (MCPT) is used to calculate the
interim utility and the terminal utility of the customers for each smoothing method.
To our surprise, the results suggest that GA method generate the highest overall
utility even though it provides the least expected return to the customers. On the
other hand, BW method overpays the customers but generates less utility to the
policyholders. These results hold when the underlying fund value follow both the
GBM model and trending bivariate OU process.
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4.6 Appendix: the fairness of the GA smoothing
method under auto-regress AR(1) model
In this section, we present the analytical result of geometric average (GA) smooth-
ing method when the underlying returns follows an AR(1) model by relaxing the
assumption of return independence. Let Sn be the price of the underlying fund at
the end of year n. The log return Xn = log(
Sn
Sn−1
) in year n follows the autoregressive
AR(1) model:
Xn+1 − θ = a(Xn − θ) + βεPn+1, (4.52)
where a is the AR parameter which controls the speed at which such trajectories will
reverse back to the long term mean θ. εPn+1 is a white noise process with mean zero
and variance one under real world measure P. β is a constant volatility parameter.
In order to let the AR(1) model be stationary, |a| < 1 is assumed. After recursive
iteration of equation (4.52), we have
Xn = a
nX0 + (1− an)θ +
n∑
i=1
ai−1βεPn−i+1, (4.53)
where the initial value X0 is θ. It is observed that the expected value for return in
each year under AR model is the same, i.e.
E(Xn) = θ ∀ n ∈ N. (4.54)
And for variance, we have
V ar(Xn) = β
2(1 + a2 + a4 + · · ·+ a2n) = β2(1− a
2n
1− a2 ). (4.55)
When n is larger, we have,
V ar(Xn)→ β
2
1− a2 . (4.56)
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Recall that we let AN and A
GA
N denote the actual value and the smoothed value
of investment fund. In the following, we compare the expected smoothed terminal
value E[AGAN ] against the actual value E[AN ] for GA smoothing method. For a
contract of N years maturity, the actual fund value is
E[AN ] = E[(1 +R1)(1 +R2) · · · (1 +RN)]
= E [Y1Y2 · · ·YN−1YN ] , (4.57)
and the smoothed fund value is
E[AGAN ] = E[(1 +R
GA
1 )(1 +R
GA
2 ) · · · (1 +RGAN )]
=E
[
[(Y−1)(Y0)(Y1)(Y2)(Y3)]
1
5 · · · [(YN−2)(YN−1)(YN) exp (2θ)] 15
]
. (4.58)
For simplicity, we let the starting time of the contract be n + 2, that is to say
Yi = 1 + Ri = exp (Xn+2+i) for i = −1, 0, 1, 2, ..., N . Hardy (2003) suggests that if
the pricing is not designed to apply at a specific starting date, the reasonable starting
value would be the long term mean value of variables. Thus, we let the starting value
Xn+2+i equal to the long term average of the return θ and the variance is
β2
1−a2 . Then
E[AN ] = E [exp (Xn+3 +Xn+4 + · · ·+Xn+N+1 +Xn+N+2)]
=E
[
exp
(
Nθ − θ
N∑
i=1
ai+2 +Xn
N∑
i=1
ai+2 +
N∑
i=1
ai+1βεPn+1 +
N∑
i=1
aiβεPn+2
+
N∑
i=1
ai−1βεPn+3 +
N−1∑
i=1
ai−1βεPn+4 + · · ·+
1∑
i=1
ai−1βεPn+N+2
)]
. (4.59)
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The smoothed fund value is calculated as
E[AGAN ] = E[(1 +R
GA
1 )(1 +R
GA
2 ) · · · (1 +RGAN )]
=E
[
[(Y−1)(Y0)(Y1)(Y2)(Y3)]
1
5 · · · [(YN−2)(YN−1)(YN) exp (2θ)] 15
]
=E
exp
Nθ − θ(15a+ 25a2 + 35a3 + 45a4 +
N∑
i=5
ai +
4
5
aN+1 +
3
5
aN+2︸ ︷︷ ︸
a3C
)
+ Xn(
1
5
a+
2
5
a2 +
3
5
a3 +
4
5
a4 +
N∑
i=5
ai +
4
5
aN+1 +
3
5
aN+2︸ ︷︷ ︸
a3C
)
+ βεPn+1(
1
5
+
2
5
a+
3
5
a2 +
4
5
a3 +
N∑
i=5
ai−1 +
4
5
aN +
3
5
aN+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
a2C
)
+ βεPn+2(
2
5
+
3
5
a+
4
5
a2 +
N∑
i=5
ai−2 +
4
5
aN−1 +
3
5
aN︸ ︷︷ ︸
aC
)
+ βεPn+3(
3
5
+
4
5
a+
N∑
i=5
ai−3 +
4
5
aN−2 +
3
5
aN−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
)
+ βεPn+4(
4
5
+
N∑
i=5
ai−4 +
4
5
aN−3 +
3
5
aN−2︸ ︷︷ ︸
C4
)
+ βεPn+5(
N−4∑
i=1
ai−1 +
4
5
aN−4 +
3
5
aN−3︸ ︷︷ ︸
C5
)
...
+ βεPn+N(
1∑
i=1
ai−1 +
4
5
a+
3
5
a2︸ ︷︷ ︸
CN
)
+ βεPn+N+1(
4
5
+
3
5
a)
+ βεPn+N+2(
3
5
)
)]
. (4.60)
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In order to compare the expected value of the smoothed fund value and the un-
smoothed fund value, we separate some items in Equation (4.59). Thus,
E[AN ] = E [exp (Nθ
−θ(1
5
(a4 + aN+1) +
2
5
(a3 + aN+2) +
3
5
a3 +
4
5
a4 +
N∑
i=5
ai +
4
5
aN+1 +
3
5
aN+2)
+ Xn(
1
5
(a4 + aN+1) +
2
5
(a3 + aN+2) +
3
5
a3 +
4
5
a4 +
N∑
i=5
ai +
4
5
aN+1 +
3
5
aN+2︸ ︷︷ ︸
a3C
)
+ βεPn+1(
1
5
(a3 + aN) +
2
5
(a2 + aN+1) +
3
5
a2 +
4
5
a3 +
N∑
i=5
ai−1 +
4
5
aN +
3
5
aN+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
a2C
)
+ βεPn+2(
1
5
(a2 + aN−1) +
2
5
(a+ aN) +
3
5
a+
4
5
a2 +
N∑
i=5
ai−2 +
4
5
aN−1 +
3
5
aN︸ ︷︷ ︸
aC
)
+ βεPn+3(
1
5
(a+ aN−2) +
2
5
(1 + aN−1) +
3
5
+
4
5
a+
N∑
i=5
ai−3 +
4
5
aN−2 +
3
5
aN−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
)
+ βεPn+4(
1
5
(1 + aN−3) +
2
5
(aN−2) +
4
5
+
N∑
i=5
ai−4 +
4
5
aN−3 +
3
5
aN−2︸ ︷︷ ︸
C4
)
+ βεPn+5(
1
5
(aN−4) +
2
5
(aN−3) +
N−4∑
i=1
ai−1 +
4
5
aN−4 +
3
5
aN−3︸ ︷︷ ︸
C5
)
...
+ βεPN(
1
5
a+
2
5
a2 +
i∑
i=1
ai−1 +
4
5
a+
3
5
a2︸ ︷︷ ︸
CN
)
+ βεPN+1(
1
5
+
2
5
a+
4
5
+
3
5
a)
+ βεPN+2(
2
5
+
3
5
)
)]
. (4.61)
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We let ZGA and Z denote the exponent in equation (4.59) and (4.60), respectively.
That is to say
E[AN ] = E [exp (Z)] , (4.62)
E[AGAN ] = E
[
exp (ZGA)
]
. (4.63)
From the properties of log-normal random variables, we know that
E[AN ] = E [exp (Z)] = exp
(
E(Z) +
1
2
V ar(Z)
)
, (4.64)
E[AGAN ] = E
[
exp (ZGA)
]
= exp (E
(
ZGA) +
1
2
V ar(ZGA)
)
. (4.65)
In order to prove E
[
AGAN
]
< E [AN ], we only need to show that V ar(Z) > V ar(Z
GA)
as E
[
ZGA
]
= E [Z]. We have
V ar(ZGA) =V ar(Xn)(
1
5
a+
2
5
a2 + a3C)2 (4.66)
+ β2(
1
5
+
2
5
a+ a2C)2 (4.67)
+ β2(
2
5
+ aC)2 (4.68)
+ β2(C2 + C24 + C
2
5 + · · ·+ C2N−1 + C2N) (4.69)
+ β2((
4
5
+
3
5
a)2 + (
3
5
)2), (4.70)
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and we also have
V ar(Z) ≥V ar(Xn)(1
5
a4 +
2
5
a3 + a3C +
2
5
aN+2)2 (4.71)
+ β2(
1
5
a3 +
2
5
a2 + a2C +
2
5
aN+1)2 (4.72)
+ β2(
1
5
a2 +
2
5
a+ aC +
2
5
aN)2 (4.73)
+ β2(
1
5
a+
2
5
+ C +
2
5
aN−1)2 (4.74)
+ β2(
1
5
+ C4 +
2
5
aN−2)2 (4.75)
+ β2(C5 +
2
5
aN−3)2 (4.76)
...
+ β2((
1
5
a2 +
2
5
a3) + CN−1)2 (4.77)
+ β2((
1
5
a+
2
5
a2) + CN)
2 (4.78)
+ β2(
1
5
+
2
5
a+
4
5
+
3
5
a)2 + β2(
2
5
+
3
5
)2. (4.79)
As we showed before,
V ar(Xn) =
β2
1− a2 = β
2(1 + a2 + a4 + · · · ). (4.80)
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We rewrite equation (4.66) as
V ar(Xn)(
1
5
a+
2
5
a2 + a3C)2
=(
1
5
a+
2
5
a2)2(1 + a2) + (
1
5
a+
2
5
a2)2(a4 + a6 + · · · )
+ 2a3C(
1
5
a+
2
5
a2) + 2a3C(
1
5
a+
2
5
a2)(a2 + a4 + · · · )
+ (a3C)2(1 + a2 + a4 + · · · )
=(
1
5
a+
2
5
a2)2 + (
1
5
a2 +
2
5
a3)2 + 2C(
1
5
a4 +
2
5
a5)
+ (
1
5
a3 +
2
5
a4)2(1 + a2 + · · · ) + 2a3C(1
5
a3 +
2
5
a4)(1 + a2 + · · · )
+ (a3C)2(1 + a2 + a4 + · · · )
= (
1
5
a+
2
5
a2)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
A1
+ (
1
5
a2 +
2
5
a3)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
A2
+ 2C(
1
5
a4 +
2
5
a5)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A3
+ (
1
5
a3 +
2
5
a4 + a3C)2V ar(Xn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A4
. (4.81)
A1 is the same as the first term in brackets of the expansion of Equation (4.78).
Similarly, A2 can be cancelled out with the first term in brackets of of the expansion
of Equation (4.77). As |a| < 1, A3 is smaller than 2C(2
5
a4 + 1
5
a5) which is found
in the expansion of the Equation (4.72). In addition, we can see that A4 is smaller
than V ar(Xn)(
1
5
a4+ 2
5
a3+a3C)2 which is Equation (4.71). For each item in equation
(4.67) - (4.70), we can always find a responding item in equation (4.72) - (4.79).
In the above, we have shown that E
[
AGAN
]
< E [AN ] holds for the AR(1) model.
Hence, we can conclude that the result that the GA smoothing methods underpaying
the customer does not only hold when the investment returns are independent.
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The design of pension contracts:
on the perspective of customers
5.1 Introduction
We study a new pension contract that operates in the accumulation phase of a pen-
sion scheme. It can be used by an insurance company to smooth the investment
return for customers. In contrast to traditional with-profits products, it has a trans-
parent structure and a clearly defined rule for bonus distribution. We compare the
new contract to another two similar contracts, which have been studied intensively
in previous papers1. Our results show that the new contract is a more attractive
contract for a customer under the Cumulative Prospect Theory, which suggests that
guarantees should be included in pension contracts.
Pension saving and investment plays an important role in an individual’s life-
time wealth management. Thanks to the development of science and health care,
people live much longer than before. In order to have a decent lifestyle in retire-
ment, people should have sufficient savings before they are out of the workforce. As
Samuelson (1958) suggests, people should save some of their income during their
working years for their retirement.
For customers, choosing a pension contract is making a decision under uncer-
1The literature includes Guille´n et al. (2006), Jørgensen and Linnemann (2012), Linnemann
et al. (2015), Døskeland and Nordahl (2008b) and Chen et al. (2015).
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tainty. Hence, decision theory is often used in designing pension and insurance con-
tracts. One widely used decision theory is Expected Utility Theory (Von Neumann
and Morgenstern, 1944) which is a dominant theory in the last century to explain
individuals’ behaviour under uncertainty. The calculation of expected utility is easy
to understand and implement. Specifically, the expected utility of an investment
is just the sum of the utility of each possible outcome weighted by its probability.
However, there are critics of Expected Utility Theory (henceforth called EUT) as
it fails to explain people’s behaviour in some cases. Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
summarise five violations of EUT in explaining people’s behaviour under uncer-
tainty. The most famous examples are Allais’ paradox (Allais, 1953) and Ellsberg’s
paradox (Ellsberg, 1961).
A new theory to describe individual’s behaviour, Cumulative Prospect Theory
(and its original version Prospect Theory2), is becoming more popular in evalu-
ating how people make decision under uncertainty. Cumulative Prospect Theory
(henceforth called CPT) is proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) to explain
the choice made by people violating the standard EUT. The most distinct part of
CPT is that it values outcomes based on gains or losses relative to a reference level
of wealth rather than on the absolute value of the wealth at retirement. In ad-
dition, people tend to overvalue small probabilities and undervalue moderate and
high probabilities. Instead of using real world probability, CPT uses a cumulative
weighting function which is a distortion of the probability.
This paper focuses on the accumulation of the pension savings. In this sense, the
pension contract works as a long term saving product which helps people accumulate
money during the working years and its proceeds can be used to provide them with
an income after their retirement. How to design an attractive pension product for
customers is of significance to the product development department of life insurance
companies and pension providers. Chen et al. (2015) suggests there are generally
two ways to design a pension contract. One is to solve an optimization problem for
2Cumulative Prospect Theory is a further development of Prospect Theory. It introduces a
cumulative weighting function to substitute the separate weighting function in Prospect Theory.
For the details of these two theories, see Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman
(1992).
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a specific utility theory and reversely design the contract from the optimal strategy.
This method has been used by Bruhn and Steffensen (2013) to reversely engineer
an optimal product under EUT. Hens and Rieger (2014) also use this method to
approximate the optimal payoff under the Prospect Theory. The other way is to find
out the contract that delivers the highest utility value among some contracts on the
perspective of the customer. This can be done by calculating the utility of different
products using a chosen utility function. The product generating the highest utility
is the most attractive one (this is done in Døskeland and Nordahl 2008b, Branger
et al. 2010, Chen et al. 2015). Another widely used method is to find the optimal
portfolio which gives the largest utility for customers. If one contract exists in the
optimal portfolio while the other does not, then the former should be viewed as a
more attractive product for customers (see Døskeland and Nordahl 2008a).
In this paper, the second way is chosen as we design the contract first. Specifi-
cally, we compare our new contract against the other two similar contracts as well
as a risky asset and a risk-free asset in two methods, finding the contract generates
the highest utility and investigating the optimal portfolio under both the CPT and
EUT, by assuming customers use a buy-and-hold strategy. As individual pension
investors tend not to review their investment holdings frequently, buy-and-hold is
a more reasonable investment strategy. The comparison results show that our con-
tract is an attractive contract to a CPT-maximising customer. However, we do not
reach the same conclusion for an EUT-maximising customer.
For a CPT investor, Døskeland and Nordahl (2008b) and Dichtl and Drobetz
(2011) provide the evidence that investment guarantees increase an investor’s util-
ity. This explains why many traditional pension contracts in the market incorporate
guarantees, either in the form of interest rate guarantees or as a sum assured. Hens
and Rieger (2014) suggest that an optimal structured product should not only have
a downside protection but also retain the potential of upside return. Their finding
is consistent with the design fashion of including a bonus feature into pension con-
tracts. Hence, our new contract is presented as the combination of a ratchet type
guarantees and a possible bonus. This kind of structure removes the risk of loss
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for a policyholders investment and keeps the opportunity to make a positive return.
There are two contracts studied in previous literature which are similar to our new
product.
There are some pension products studied in the literature with a similar struc-
ture in terms of ratchet style guarantees, a smoothing mechanism and a possible
bonus. They are different from each other mainly because of their bonus determi-
nation method. As Zemp (2011) suggests, most of these products can be grouped
in two categories. One is a return-based bonus distribution. For instance, Bacinello
(2001) determines the bonus by comparing the annual investment return with the
guaranteed rate while Haberman et al. (2003) use the past three years’ average re-
turn. The other category is a reserve-based bonus distribution. These contracts
generally have a target buffer ratio or a target reserve level for the insurance com-
pany, as Grosen and Jørgensen (2000) and Hansen and Miltersen (2002) show. In
contrast to these approaches, the bonus determination method of our new contract
is to compare the value of a specified investment account and the customer account.
It has a well-defined return distribution rule and a transparent product structure.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 5.2, we introduce
the new pension contract. The pricing and some characteristics of the new contract
are also given in this part. Additionally, two similar pension contracts, one with a
similar product structure but without guarantee embedded3 and the other providing
similar guarantees but with an entirely different product structure4, are introduced
in this part as well. Section 5.3 compares the new contract with these two contracts
under CPT. In Section 5.4, some robustness and sensitivity test are carried out.
In order to know how these two contracts perform for an EUT customer, we also
provide a comparison for these three contracts under EUT in Section 5.5. The last
part of this paper is the conclusion.
3This contract is discussed by Guille´n et al. (2006), Jørgensen and Linnemann (2012) and
Linnemann et al. (2015).
4This contract is studied by Døskeland and Nordahl (2008b) and Chen et al. (2015).
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5.2 Product design
Mortality, surrender and expense are not considered in this paper5, as we are more
interested in the savings aspect of pension products. Here, the new contract is
introduced in detail. A brief introduction of the other two similar contracts are also
given in this part.
5.2.1 Financial market model
It is assumed that the investment takes over a finite time horizon [0, T ], where T
is a strictly positive integer. There are only two underlying assets in the market.
One is the risk free asset and the other is the risky asset. The risk free asset can
be a government bond while the risky asset could be an equity index. The prices of
both assets are available in the market. Pension contracts are derivatives of these
two underlying assets. The evolution of the value of the risk free asset Bt is
dBt = rBtdt, B0 = b, (5.1)
where r > 0 is the constant risk-free interest rate and b > 0 is a constant. The price
of the risky asset follows the following geometric Brownian motion.
dSt = µStdt+ σStdWt, S0 = s, (5.2)
where the expected growth rate µ, volatility σ and initial value s are positive con-
stants. W is a standard Brownian motion defined on the filtered probability space
(Ω,F, (Ft),P). All the perfect market assumptions suggested by Black and Scholes
(1973) hold here. The Black-Scholes model is widely used in literature for the study
of insurance and pension contracts, e.g. Døskeland and Nordahl (2008b), Branger
et al. (2010) and Bauer et al. (2006).
5There are many papers studying the pricing of life and pension contracts when mortality,
surrender and expense are considered; see Albizzati and Geman (1994), Grosen and Jørgensen
(1997), Bacinello (2001) and Hansen and Miltersen (2002).
103
Chapter 5: The design of pension contracts: on the perspective of customers
5.2.2 New contract
The inspiration for the new contract arises from Guille´n et al. (2006). In their paper,
they study a pension product with the features of a transparent structure and no
embedded guarantee. We refer to this contract as the GJN contract, although it
appears to be a contract that is sold in Denmark6.
The GJN contract enjoys the return from the underlying asset but cannot pro-
vide the protection for policyholders against the downside risk if the market performs
badly. However, according to the findings of Hens and Rieger (2014), incorporating
the feature of downside capital protection while keeping the exposure to the upward
return makes structured products more attractive. Hence, by modifying the return
distribution rule in the GJN contract, we obtain a new pension contract whose value
to the customers has a lower bound. In addition, the payoff of the new contract is
determined by the performance of a specified asset whose price is known to the pub-
lic. Along with the clear profit distribution rule, this ensures that the return from
the new contract is transparent.
5.2.2.1 Structure of new contract
Our new contract consists of three accounts: the investment account A, the customer
account D and the smoothing account U . The value of the investment account is
always equal to the sum of customer account D and smoothing account U . Mathe-
matically,
At = Dt + Ut, for all t ∈ [0, T ]. (5.3)
The investment account A is a notional account which replicates the trend of the
risky asset. For simplicity, the customer is assumed to pay a one-off premium P > 0
at the start. Then the value of the investment account of this customer is given as:
At = P exp [(µ− 1
2
σ2)t+ σWt], for all t ∈ [0, T ]. (5.4)
6This contract is called Tidspension. The contract introduced in Guille´n et al. (2006) is the
accumulation part of Tidspension.
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On the expiration date T , the customer will receive all the money in the customer
account D. At the end of year n, the nominal value of the customer account increases
at a pre-declared guaranteed rate gn (it is generally declared at the beginning of
the year, in practice). Apart from this guaranteed return, the customer account
is credited an annual bonus which is defined as a fixed proportion α ∈ [0, 1] of
the excess value of the investment account over the guaranteed value of customer
account. The proportion α is generally called the participation rate or distribution
ratio. The other part, 1 − α of the excess value, goes to the smoothing account U
which provides the customer account with the guaranteed return when the market
performance is bad. The value of customer account and smoothing account are
updated only at the end of each year. The value of the customer account is:
Dn =
 P, n = 0,(1 + gn)Dn−1 + αmax [An − (1 + gn)Dn−1, 0], n ∈ {1, 2, ..., T}. (5.5)
At the end of each year, the customer receives a positive return, or so-called bonus, if
the value of the investment account is larger than the value of the customer account
in the previous year increased at the guaranteed rate gn ≥ 0. Otherwise, the bonus
is zero and the customer account only increases at the guaranteed rate. According
to equations (5.3) - (5.5), the value of the smoothing account is
Un =
 0, n = 0,An − (1 + gn)Dn−1 − αmax [An − (1 + gn)Dn−1, 0], n ∈ {1, 2, ..., T}.
(5.6)
From equation (5.6), we can see that the smoothing account can be negative in
which case the value of the investment account is less than the customer account.
It is important to note that the value of the customer account or smoothing
account is a nominal value. It is not the market value of each account, although the
nominal value and the market value have the same initial value and terminal value.
There is no cash-flow to the customer account at the end of each year before the
maturity date T . The only cash-flow happens at time T when the insurer pays the
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terminal value DT to the policyholder. The advantage of the contract is that the
customers can understand what they receive at the terminal time T . In addition,
the investment strategy that replicates their terminal payoff is not, in general, to
invest their premium entirely in the risky asset. Thus, the value of the replicating
portfolio is not likely to be equal to the value of the customer account before the
maturity date T . This is discussed in Guille´n et al. (2006) in relation to the contract
that they study.
5.2.2.2 Terminal value of the customer account
In the following, we give an expression for the terminal value for the customer
account. The customer of our new contract receives an annual bonus which can never
be negative, as can be seen from equation (5.5). The annual bonus is the payoff of
a one year call option with underlying price An and strike price Kn = (1 + gn)Dn−1.
We let Cn denote the payoff of nth year option, i.e.,
Cn = max[An − (1 + gn)Dn−1, 0], n ∈ {1, 2, ..., T}. (5.7)
For simplicity, the guaranteed rate gn is assumed to be a constant value g, i.e., gn = g
for n ∈ {1, 2, ..., T}. After recursive substitution of the second part in equation (5.5),
we get
Dn = Dj(1 + g)
n−j + α
n∑
i=j+1
Ci(1 + g)
n−i, for 0 ≤ j < n ≤ T, (5.8)
where j ∈ {0, 1, ..., T}. If we let j = 0 and n = T , then the value of the customer
account at the maturity date is
DT = D0(1 + g)
T + α
T∑
i=1
Ci(1 + g)
T−i. (5.9)
From equation (5.9), we can separate the value of customer account into two parts.
The first part is a pure risk-free bond with the interest rate g and the second part is
a series of consecutive forward start one-year call options (ratchet style). All options
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begin from the start of the contract but only the first option’s strike price is known
at the start. In year n, there are T−n+1 contracts in force and only the strike price
of nth option is known. Hence, the terminal value in the customer account depends
not only on the participation rate α, guarantee rate g and the contract term T , but
also on the paths of {An}Tn=0.
5.2.2.3 Fair pricing of the contract
In this section, we show how to fairly price this contract and present some of its
characteristics. We have shown the payoff of the new contract above. But it is
also important for insurers to know the market value of the new contract during its
lifetime.
Pricing pension contracts is generally carried out under an equivalent martingale
measure (Harrison and Kreps, 1979). There are many papers using this method in
the pricing of pension contracts, like Bacinello (2001), Grosen and Jørgensen (2000)
and Bauer et al. (2006).
Let rf = e
r− 1 be the discretely-compounded annual risk free interest rate and
V D(t) denote the market value of the customer account at time t. Discounting the
terminal value DT back to time 0 under the equivalent martingale measure Q, we
get the initial price of this contract. That is
V D(0) = ( 1+g
1+rf
)TD0 +
α
(1+rf )T
EQ
(∑T
i=1 max
[
Ai − (1 + g)Di−1, 0
]
(1 + g)T−i
)
.
(5.10)
If the expected discounted value of the terminal value in the customer account
V D(0), at time 0, is equal to customer’s initial premium P , then this contract is
viewed as a fair contract for the customer. We also can price this contract from the
perspective of the insurer. The insurer does not put any money into the smooth-
ing account at the start of the contract and will keep the terminal value in the
smoothing account which can be positive or negative. For a fair contract, the ex-
pected discounted value of the smoothing account is zero. However, as Equation
(5.6) shows, valuing the smoothing account is a matter of valuing the customer ac-
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count first and then subtracting its value from the investment account. That is,
V U(0) = A0− V D(0), where V U(t) is the market value of the smoothing account at
time t. Thus, we only need to show the pricing based on the customer account.
Observe from equation (5.10) that the first component, ( 1+g
1+rf
)TD0, is the present
value of a fixed income asset with the interest rate g. The second part is the present
value of a series of the payoffs of call options. The payoff for each of these call
options is worth at least zero. Thus we must have g ≤ rf to make this contract fair.
As we cannot get a closed form solution for the pricing of the new product due to
the path-dependency of the options, Monte Carlo simulation is used to price this
contract.
Under a risk neutral measure Q, the value of the investment account can be expressed
as
At = P exp [(r − 1
2
σ2)t+ σWQt ], for all t ∈ [0, T ]. (5.11)
For a contract with fixed term T , the guarantee rate g and participation rate
α are two parameters under the insurer’s control which could be adjusted to make
this contract a fair one. In order to identify the relationship between g and α, we
fix the value of one parameter and find out the value of the other which makes the
contract fair. Newton’s method is used to solve this problem.
Figure 5.1 shows the relationship between these two parameters for a 20 year contract
with risk free rate rf = 0.04 and volatility σ ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3}. The participation rate
α decreases with the increase of the guarantee rate g. This is intuitive, as the
customer should have a lower share of the excess return with the increase of the
guaranteed return. If the guaranteed return equals to the risk free rate, then the
customer only holds a pure risk free bond. The figure also shows that the higher the
volatility σ, the lower the participation rate α. As the market become more volatile,
the investment account is more likely to make a loss, the guarantees become more
valuable and thus lead to a smaller participation rate.
As we mentioned earlier, the value of the customer account Dt tends to be
different from the market value of the customer account V D(t) at any time t ∈ (0, T ),
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Figure 5.1: Relationship between guarantee rate g and participation rate α. T = 20
years, rf = 0.04 and σ ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3}.
though the start value and the terminal value of the two are the same. In order to
show how the customer account value and the market value of customer account
evolve in different market scenarios, we choose two different scenarios simulated
from equation (5.4). The parameters we used in the simulation are rf = 0.04,
µ = 0.065 and σ = 0.15.7
• Bull market scenario.
The value of the risky asset mainly follows an upward trend.
• Bear market scenario.
The value of the risky asset mainly follows a downward trend.
Figure 5.2 shows the behaviour of the nominal value of the customer account, the
market value of customer account and the investment account value in a bull market
scenario. The customer account value Dt rises in a step-wise fashion every year. It
7The parameters are used by Døskeland and Nordahl (2008b) in their paper. FTSE All Share
historical return from 1986 to 2015 was 6.4 % and the volatilit was 15.8%. The yield of 10 year
government bond from 1996 to 2015 was 4.35%. Thus, we believe the chosen parameters are
reasonable.
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Figure 5.2: The behaviour of account balance Dt, market value of customer account
V D(t) and investment account At in bull market. α = 0.13. T = 20 years, g = 0.02,
rf = 0.04, µ = 0.065 and σ = 0.15. In the simulation, there are 100 steps in each
year.
never decreases due to the guarantee on the participation in the risky asset return,
unlike the contract studied in Guille´n et al. (2006). In the first 5 years, the market
value of customer account V D(t) follows closely with the investment account At.
In contrast, it follows closely the customer account value Dt in the later period of
the contract. At the terminal time, V D(T ) = DT . In this scenario, the investment
account has a much higher terminal value than the customer account.
In Figure 5.3, the bear market scenario, the market value of customer account V D(t)
also tracks closely the investment fund for the first few years and moves along the
customer account value during the last few years. But this time the customer ac-
count has a much larger terminal value than the investment account. In other words,
the customer’s money still increases even when the risky asset performs badly.
5.2.2.4 Investment strategy
Rather than investing all of the customer’s premium in the risky asset, the insurer
could construct the replicating portfolio to replicate the market value of the customer
account. This could mitigate the hedging error to which the former strategy exposes
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Figure 5.3: The behaviour of account balance Dt, market value of customer account
V D(t) and investment account At in bear market. α = 0.13. T = 20 years, g = 0.02,
rf = 0.04 , µ = 0.065 and σ = 0.15. In the simulation, there are 100 steps in each
year.
the insurer. The weight in risky asset, or the Delta of the portfolio, can be calculated
by using a Monte Carlo method. Figure 5.4 shows the average weight of portfolio in
the risky asset, which is calculated using a finite difference approximation. We can
see that as the contract approaches the maturity date, the weight of the risky asset
in the portfolio is decreasing. The hedging portfolio shows a life-style investment
strategy. In other words, you should put more money in risky asset if you are young
and hold less in the risky asset when you are old. If the insurer follows the replicating
portfolio, then at time T , the value of the replicating portfolio is V D(T ) = DT , a.s.
Suppose the insurer does not follow the replicating portfolio. Instead, they
invest all the premium into the risky asset at the start and hold until the maturity.
This approach leads to a hedging error, At − V D(t), which equals the market value
of the smoothing account, V U(t). The smoothing account belongs to the insurer,
which makes sense as the hedging error is the responsibility of the insurer too. If
the insurer chooses not to follow the replicating strategy for the contract, then it
should bear the financial consequences, rather than the customers. In this sense,
if we are in the bull scenario (Figure 5.2), the excess investment gains, AT − DT ,
goes into the smoothing account, which belongs to the insurer. If we are in the bear
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Figure 5.4: The mean of portfolio weight in risky asset. It is calculated by simulating
100 paths. α = 0.13. T = 20 years, rf = 0.04, µ = 0.065 and σ = 0.15.
scenario as Figure 5.3 shows, the insurer needs to use its own money to meet the
full terminal value of the customer account DT by injecting the amount, DT − AT ,
at time T .
5.2.3 GJN contract
In this part, we briefly introduce the pension contract which is discussed in Guille´n
et al. (2006), as we will compare the new contract against this contract in next
section. The structure of GJN contracts is similar to our new contract. The only
difference is GJN contract lacks protection for the downside risk. Specifically, each
year, the value of customer account increases at a constant discretely-compounded
reference policy interest rate rp. The reference policy interest rate rp in the GJN
contract is analogous to the guaranteed rate g in the new contract. In addition
to this, the policyholder can receive a fixed portion of the difference between the
value of the investment account An and the value of the previous year’s customer
account D′n−1 accumulated at the reference policy interest rate rp. Mathematically,
the development of the customer account in the GJN contract is expressed as
D′n =
 P, n = 0,(1 + rp)D′n−1 + α′[An − (1 + rp)D′n−1], n ∈ {1, ..., T}, (5.12)
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where the constant α′ ∈ [0, 1] is the participation rate. Similar to the new contract,
the value of the smoothing account in GJN contract is U ′n = An −D′n.
It is worth mentioning here that if the investment account An has a lower value
than the guaranteed value of customer account, the value of [An− (1 + rp)D′n−1] can
be negative. That is to say that the customer account is credited with a negative
bonus and the value of customer account decreases. This is the critical difference
between the GJN contract and the new contract. In the new contract, the customer
will never have a loss in the customer account.
For both contracts, the smoothing account accumulates wealth when the market
performance is good and gives money back when the market performs badly. Ideally,
the smoothing account is expected to even out the short-term fluctuations over a
long term. In some situations when the market returns are too bad, the smoothing
account in both contracts would end up with a negative value, i.e., a loss. In
some other situations, the smoothing account ends up with a positive balance and
generates profit for the insurance company. As we discussed before, this is only a
true profit or loss if the company does not follow the replicating strategy for the
terminal value of the customer account.
5.2.4 DN contract
Døskeland and Nordahl (2008b) introduce a contract which consists of four accounts:
the investment account A′′t , customer account Lt, bonus account It and insurer
account Et. For easier comparison, we change the wording and notation of this
contract. Specifically, at time 0, the customer pays the premium P into the customer
account, i.e., L0 = P . Different from the other two contracts, the insurer also
needs to put money in at the outset for this contract and the money is deposited
into the insurer account. The money in customer account and insurer account are
invested into the risky asset. The market value of this investment is denoted by the
investment account A′′t . That the insurer does not follow the replicating portfolio
is a critical distinction for the DN contract. The proportion of the premium relates
to the value of the investment account at the start, ψ = P
A′′0
, is called the capital
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structure parameter. The initial value of the insurer account is E0 =
1−ψ
ψ
P . Thus,
A′′0 = L0 + E0. Additionally, the bonus account has an initial value I0 = 0.
The mathematical expression of the customer account Lt, the bonus account It
and the insurer account Et for t = 1, 2, ..., T are given as
Lt =

A′′t , if A
′′
t ≤ Lt−1(1 + g′′),
Lt−1(1 + g′′), otherwise A′′t ≤ (Lt−1 + Et−1)(1 + g′′) + It−1,
Lt−1(1 + g′′) + ψη(1− θ)
·
(
A′′t −
[
(Lt−1 + Et−1)(1 + g′′) + It−1
])
, if A′′t > (Lt−1 + Et−1)(1 + g
′′) + It−1,
(5.13)
It =

0, if A′′t ≤ Lt−1(1 + g′′) + Et−1,
A′′t − Lt−1(1 + g′′)− Et−1, otherwise A′′t ≤ Lt−1(1 + g′′) + Et−1 + It−1,
It−1, otherwise A′′t ≤ (Lt−1 + Et−1)(1 + g′′) + It−1,
It−1 + ψηθ
·
(
A′′t −
[
(Lt−1 + Et−1)(1 + g′′) + It−1
])
, if Lt > Lt−1(1 + g′′) + Et−1(1 + g′′) + It−1,
(5.14)
Et = A
′′
t − Lt − It, (5.15)
where η ∈ [0, 1] is the customer share of the profits and θ ∈ [0, 1] is the proportion
of declared bonuses credited to the bonus account.
The customer receive at the expiration date D′′T is the sum of the value of the
customer account LT and the bonus account IT . In the paper of Døskeland and
Nordahl (2008b), the insurer is allowed to go into bankruptcy (A′′t < Lt−1(1 + g
′′)),
in which case the terminal payoff to the customers is the value of the investment
account at the time of bankruptcy, accumulated at the risk-free rate to the maturity
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date of the contract. That is,
D′′T = Aτ (1 + rf )
T−τ , (5.16)
where τ ∈ (0, T ) is the bankruptcy time. As the customer account is only updated
at the end of each year, the bankruptcy time can only be an integer time. It is
noted that in the case of bankruptcy, the annual guarantees can not be met. In
other words, customers may receive less than the guaranteed value.
5.3 Comparison under CPT
In this part, we compare the new contract with the GJN contract and the DN
contract in detail. The results provide the evidence that the new contract is more
preferable than the other two. Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) is used in this
section to compare these three contracts. The comparison is based on the results of
Monte Carlo simulations. An alternative test using EUT is given in Section 5.5.
5.3.1 Cumulative Prospect Theory
Now we examine the performance of these three contracts under the behavioural
Economics model, CPT. Compared to EUT, CPT assumes that a person values
an investment by gains or losses rather than the terminal wealth. The gains and
losses are calculated by comparing the terminal value of an investment to a reference
point which is often the current wealth. In this paper, we choose the initial invest-
ment, the premium P , as the reference point. If the terminal value the customer
received D∗T (DT , D
′
T , D
′′
T ) is smaller than the premium, i.e., X = D
∗
T − P < 0,
the outcome is viewed as a loss. Otherwise, it is a gain. An investment con-
sisting of m outcomes of losses and n outcomes of gains is expressed as a risk
prospect f = (x−m, p−m;x−m+1, p−m+1; ...;xi, pi; ...;xn−1, pn−1;xn, pn) where xi is
a potential outcome of the prospect and pi is the corresponding probability for
i = {−m,−m+ 1, 0, ...n− 1, n}. CPT evaluates gains and losses separately, and the
overall utility is the sum of utility of the positive part f+ and the negative part f−.
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V (f) = V (f+) + V (f−) =
∑n
i=0 pi
+
i v(xi) +
∑0
i=−m pi
−
i v(xi), −m < i < n,
(5.17)
where v(xi) is the value function of outcome xi and pi
+(−)
i is the decision weight of
this outcome. The value function shows how the individual values the outcomes.
The decision weight is calculated by weighting function w : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] (Choquet
(1954)) which is a distortion of real probability. The weighting function describes
how people deal with probabilities. For a positive outcome xj, the decision weight
pi+j is
pi+j = w(pj + ...+ pn)− w(pj+1 + ...+ pn). (5.18)
On the other hand, the decision weight for a negative outcome xi is:
pi−i = w(p−m + ...+ pi)− w(p−m + ...+ pi−1). (5.19)
The value function used in this paper is proposed by Tversky and Kahneman
(1992),
v(x) =
 x
β, if x ≥ 0,
−λ(−x)β, if x < 0,
(5.20)
where λ = 2.25 and β = 0.5. λ > 1 is the loss aversion parameter, which shows
individuals are much more sensitive to losses than gains. β is the sensitivity of
customers to the increasing gains or losses. Prelec (1998) proposes a one parameter
weighting function, namely the Prelec’s weighting function:
w(p) = e−(− ln p)
ϕ
. (5.21)
Døskeland and Nordahl (2008b) suggest Prelec’s weighting function is based on
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behavioural axioms rather than mathematical convenience. In this section, we follow
Døskeland and Nordahl (2008b) to use the Prelec’s weighting function and their
chosen parameter ϕ = 0.75. There are other possible choices of the weighting
functions, one of which we investigate in Section 5.4.
5.3.2 Analysis of products under CPT
A pension contract is a long term investment. Once a customer purchases a pension
contract, it is not likely for him to sell this policy or change his investment portfolio.
Hence, a buy-and-hold strategy is a reasonable assumption which we make for all the
comparisons below. We find that our new contract generates the highest certainty
equivalent value of CPT utility, compared to other available investments.
It is assumed that a customer has an initial wealth of 1 unit and plans to invest
the money with a horizon of T years. There are five possible investment opportu-
nities for the customer: the new contract, the GJN contract, the DN contract, the
risk-free asset and the risky asset. Each asset has an initial price of 1 and for the
pension contracts the price is the premium. It is possible to buy any amount of the
above five assets.
5.3.2.1 Holding exactly one asset or contract
In the first analysis, we find out holding all of the customer’s wealth in a single
asset or contract for T years results in the largest CPT utility at the end of the time
horizon. Numerical simulation of 1, 000, 000 paths is used to solve this problem. For
the parameters of simulation, we follow Guille´n et al. (2006) and let the investment
horizon be T = 20 years which is a reasonable investment horizon for a pension
contract. The risk-free rate is assumed as r = 0.04. For the risky asset, the expected
return is µ = 0.065 and the volatility is assumed as σ = 0.15. In order to match the
properties of the new contract and the DN contract, we arbitrarily choose the same
guarantee rate g = g′′ = 0.02 for both contracts 8. Making the new contract fair,
the corresponding participation ratio can be solved by letting equation (5.10) equal
8Døskeland and Nordahl (2008b) use a 2% guaranteed rate in their paper.
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the initial investment P under the risk neutral measure Q. The numerical result
gives α = 0.13. We use the same method to find the fair value of the parameter ψ
for the adjusted DN contract. Guille´n et al. (2006) show that a fair GJN contract
only requires rp = rf if the underlying asset follows a geometric Brownian motion.
Hence we can also set the participation rate of GJN model equal to 0.13 so that
both contracts have the same participation rate.
Based on the simulation paths, we calculate the expected terminal wealth, the
standard deviation of the terminal wealth and the certainty equivalent value (CEV)
of the CPT utility for holding each of the above five investments under a buy-and-
hold strategy. CEV is the amount of money which generates with absolute certainty
the same expected CPT utility as a given risky asset. The results are given in Table
5.1. From the CEV row, we can see that holding only the new contract generates
the highest CEV which suggests it produces the highest CPT utility for a 20-year
investment horizon. The GJN contract generates slightly higher CPT utility than
the risky asset. The risk-free asset produces the smallest CPT utility. In other
words, if the customer can hold exactly one of the above assets or contracts for
20 years, then the new contract is the best choice. This result is consistent with
the result in Døskeland and Nordahl (2008b) which shows holding a contract with
annual guarantees gives higher CPT utility than holding the underlying asset itself.
It is important to point out that the DN contract does not give a high CPT utility.
Compared to the other two contracts, the expected terminal value is much less.
This is because the insurer of DN contract is so likely to go into bankruptcy (with
probability of 69%). After bankruptcy, the DN contract works as a risk-free asset.
This also explains the small standard deviation of the DN contract.
5.3.2.2 Holding a combination of the assets and contracts
If the customer could choose any combination of the above five assets instead of
holding only one of them, what is the optimal portfolio generates the largest CPT
utility? Now the optimisation problem is to find the weights of the above five assets
in the optimal portfolio. In general, individual investors will not do borrowing and
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New
contract
GJN
contract
DN
contract
Risk-free
asset
Risky
asset
CEV 2.7854 2.6371 2.5892 2.1911 2.6337
E(DT )
2.8844
(5.3 %)
3.0623
(5.6 %)
2.5680
(4.7 %)
2.1911
(3.9 %)
3.5213
(6.3
%)
SD(DT ) 1.5022 1.6970 1.0559 0 2.6483
Table 5.1: Certainty equivalent value of CPT utility (CEV ), expected value (E) and
standard deviation (SD) of the terminal wealth by holding exactly one of the new contract,
the GJN contract, the DN contract, the risk-free asset and the risky asset. The value in the
bracket is the annualised continuously-compounded return of the expected terminal wealth.
The CPT utility is calculated by equation (5.20) and equation (5.21). The parameters
are g = g′′ = 0.02, rp = 0.04, P = 1, α = 0.13, T = 20, rf = 0.04, µ = 0.065, σ = 0.15,
ψ = 0.9, θ = 0.2, ϕ = 0.75 and β = 0.5.
New
contract
GJN
contract
DN
contract
Risk-free
asset
Risky
asset
weight 44 % 0 13% 0 43 %
Table 5.2: Proportion of the new contract, the GJN contract, the DN contract, risk-
free asset and the risky asset in the optimal portfolio under CPT . The parameters are
g = g′′ = 0.02, rp = 0.04, P = 1, α = 0.13, T = 20, rf = 0.04, µ = 0.065, σ = 0.15,
ψ = 0.9, θ = 0.2, ϕ = 0.75 and β = 0.5. The CEV of CPT utility of this optimised
portfolio is 2.9150.
short selling. Hence, short-selling and borrowing are not allowed here. Additionally,
re-balancing investments is not common in practice for individual pension investors,
so the buy-and-hold strategy is also assumed here.
The simulation result shows, in the optimal portfolio, the new contract takes up
44% of the optimised portfolio while the risky asset receives 43%. The DN contracts
occupies the remaining weight. No weight is assigned to the GJN contract and risk-
free asset. The CEV of CPT utility of this optimised portfolio is 2.9150, which is
larger than holding any one asset or contract in Table 5.1. That is to say, the optimal
pension investment portfolio consists of only the new contract, the DN contract and
the risky asset. Holding any other asset leads to a loss of CPT utility. In this sense,
pension contracts with guarantees are more attractive than those without. Based
on the results from Section 5.3.2.1 and 5.3.2.2, we can conclude that under both
methods, the new contract is preferred to the GJN contract and the DN contract
from the perspective of a CPT-maximising customer.
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5.3.3 Sensitivity analysis
In the market, pension contract customers are from different age groups. It is natural
that customers tend to buy a pension contract with the term that best matches their
time until retirement. In this part, we investigate how the proportion of the optimal
portfolio would change for different investment horizons.
We calculate the optimised portfolio in terms of the above five investment op-
portunities for different investment horizons from 1 year to 30 years. The result is
presented in Figure 5.5. The new contract and the risky asset dominate the optimal
portfolio. Specifically, the new contract takes up the largest proportion in the opti-
mal portfolio for horizons from 1 year to 17 years while the risky asset becomes the
dominant component for investment horizon with 18 years or more. The reason is
that the risky asset is much more volatile and thus is more likely to make a loss for a
short horizon. As the investment horizon increases, its higher expected return makes
the risky asset more attractive. DN contract emerges in year 5 and then increases
with the investment horizon. For horizons longer than 25 years, the proportion of
DN contract starts to decrease gradually. As before, we find that the GJN contract
is not in the optimal portfolio for any investment horizon. As it neither avoids the
investment losses for short horizons nor has a higher return in the long term, it is
not surprising that it is not in the optimal portfolio for any investment horizon.
One important feature of DN contract worth mentioning here. For DN contract,
the insurer also needs to invest money in at the outset. In addition, as the expected
return of risky asset is higher than the guaranteed return of insurer account, the
bonus the customer receives is higher than the other two contracts. So the expected
return for DN contract is actually higher than the new contract and the GJN contract
for short horizons. However, once the insurer go into bankruptcy, the guarantees
cannot be met. For customers with short investment horizons, keeping the deposit
safe is very important. This is proved by Figure 5.5 that only the risk-free asset
and the new contract are in the optimal portfolio. For longer investment horizons,
both the new contract and DN contract tend to have a good expected return if the
market performs good. However, for those bear market scenarios, the DN contract
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Figure 5.5: The composition of the optimal portfolio for different investment hori-
zons. The parameters are P = 1, rf = 0.04, µ = 0.065, σ = 0.15, ϕ = 0.75 and
β = 0.5.
is likely to go into bankruptcy. In this case, the value of DN contract accumulates
at the risk free rate (4%) which is higher than the guaranteed rate (2%). As the
correlation between DN contract and the risky asset is much less than the correlation
between the new contract and the risky asset, the combination of risky asset and the
DN contract is a better portfolio. This explains why the proportion of DN contract
increases with the investment horizons for most of time.
With a higher µ and σ,9 a broadly similar result is obtained (Figure 5.6).
Both results are consistent with the well known pension investment advice that if
customers are young, they should put more money in the risky asset to benefit from
the higher expected returns, whereas older people should buy less risky products.
There is a distinct point in Figure 5.6, which is the dramatic decline of the proportion
of the DN contract when the investment horizon changes from 13 years to 14 years.
The proportion slumps from 43% for a 13-year-length contract to 0% for a 14-year-
length contract.
In order to show this sudden drop in detail, we examine the CPT CEV for all
combinations of the risky asset and the DN contract for investment horizons of 13
years and 14 years (Figure 5.7). With the increase of the investment horizon, the
9We choose µ = 0.10 and σ = 0.20 whose value are based on US S&P 500 historical data from
1997 to 2016. The average annual return of S&P 500 in this period is 9.27% and the 12-month
realised volatility is 19.7%. The average 10-year Treasury rate during the same period is 3.97%.
121
Chapter 5: The design of pension contracts: on the perspective of customers
Figure 5.6: The composition of the optimal portfolio for different investment hori-
zons. The parameters are P = 1, rf = 0.04, µ = 0.1, σ = 0.2, ϕ = 0.75 and
β = 0.5.
CPT CEV of holding either 100% in the risky asset or 100% in the DN contract
is rising. But the CPT CEV of holding 100% in the risky asset increases much
faster than holding 100% in the DN contract. This is consistent with the increased
investment in the risky asset in the optimal portfolio as the investment horizon gets
longer (Figure 5.5). As the risky asset giving a larger boost to the CPT CEV,
and the CPT CEV being reasonably flat for initial portfolios with between 50% and
100% in the risky asset at the 14-year-time horizon (Figure 5.7b). The optimal point
changes from an internal point to a left end point from 13-year horizon to 14-year
horizon. This explains the plummet of the proportion of DN contract in Figure 5.6.
5.4 Robust testing of the CPT-based results
In this part, some robust tests of our result are presented. Firstly, we calculate the
result using an alternative CPT weighting function that is proposed in Tversky and
Kahneman (1992), but keeping the same value function, Equation (5.20). The new
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(a) T = 13.
(b) T = 14.
Figure 5.7: The CPT CEV for combinations of the DN contract and the risky asset.
The parameters are rf = 0.04, µ = 0.1, σ = 0.2.
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New
contract
GJN
contract
DN
contract
Risk-
free
asset
Risky
asset
CEV 2.7265 2.4183 2.5723 2.1911 2.3711
E(DT )
2.8837
(5.3 %)
3.0631
(5.6 %)
2.5683
(4.7 %)
2.1911
(3.9 %)
3.5261
(6.3
%)
SD(DT ) 1.5072 1.7021 1.0605 0 2.6667
Table 5.3: Certainty equivalent value of CPT utility (CEV ), expected value (E) and stan-
dard deviation (SD) of the terminal wealth by holding exactly one of the GJN contract,
the new contract, the DN contract, the risk-free asset and the risky asset. The value in
the bracket is the annualised continuously-compounded return of the expected terminal
wealth. The CPT utility is calculated by Equation (5.20) and Equation (5.22). The pa-
rameters are g = g′′ = 0.02, rp = 0.04, P = 1, α = 0.13, T = 20, rf = 0.04, µ = 0.065,
σ = 0.15, ψ = 0.9, θ = 0.2, ϕ = 0.75, ν = 0.61 and δ = 0.69.
weighting function is given as:

w+(p) = p
ν
(pν+(1−p)ν) 1ν
,
w−(p) = p
δ
(pδ+(1−p)δ) 1δ
,
(5.22)
where ν = 0.61 and δ = 0.69. Otherwise, we use the same parameter values as in
Section 5.3.2.
The CPT CEV for holding only one of the five assets or contracts using the new
weighting function is calculated (Table 5.3). Ordering by the CEV value, the same
ranking is obtained as before (Table 5.1), albeit with different values. Calculating
the optimal portfolio, again we find that only the new contract (28% of the initial
optimal portfolio), the DN contract(34% of the initial optimal portfolio) and the
risky asset ( 38% of the initial optimal portfolio) are in it, for a 20-year-time horizon.
Even under a different weighting function, the GJN contract, which does not have
guarantees embedded, is not in the optimal portfolio.
Furthermore, calculating the optimal portfolio at different time horizons, we
obtain similar figures to Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6. In Figure 5.8, the risky asset
appears in the optimal portfolio for time horizons of 11 years or more, compared
to 5 years or more in Figure 5.5. In Figure 5.9, the risky asset forms 100% of the
optimal portfolio for time horizons of 18 years or more, compared to 15 years or
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Figure 5.8: The composition of optimal portfolio for different terms using the value
function and weighting function defined in Tversky and Kahneman (1992). rf =
0.04, µ = 0.065 and σ = 0.15.
more in Figure 5.6.
Next, we use a different parameterization of the value function (5.20) (The
weighting function is given by Equation (5.21), which we used in Section 5.3.3).
The parameter β controls the curvature of the value function. With the increase
of β, the value function shows less risk aversion for gains and less risk seeking for
losses.
The optimal portfolio for different horizons is re-calculated with β = 0.88,
as used by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) (Figure 5.10, otherwise using the same
parameters as Figure 5.5). The risk-free asset is not in the optimal portfolio for any
investment horizon. Additionally, the risky asset has a much higher percentage of
the optimal portfolio than before. This result reflects a lower aversion to loss by the
customer.
5.5 Comparison under EUT
In this part, we compare the new contract against the GJN contract and the DN
contract under Expected utility theory (EUT). Although the EUT has some weak-
nesses to explain individual’s behaviour under uncertainty, it is still used widely
in measuring individuals’ preference for investments. For example, Døskeland and
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Figure 5.9: The composition of optimal portfolio for different terms using the value
function and weighting function defined in Tversky and Kahneman (1992). rf =
0.04, µ = 0.1 and σ = 0.2.
Figure 5.10: The composition of the optimal portfolio for different investment hori-
zons. The parameters are rf = 0.04, µ = 0.065, σ = 0.15 and β = 0.88.
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Nordahl (2008a) use a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function to
represent household’s preference when studying a with-profits contract. In addition,
Schmeiser and Wagner (2015) maximise the participating contract policyholders’
utility by employing the CRRA utility function. More recent research on measuring
the utilities of pension products can be see from Chen et al. (2016) and Braun et al.
(2019).
It is assumed that the policyholder’s preference can be expressed by a CRRA
utility function as follows:
u(M) =
1
1− γM
1−γ, γ > 0, γ 6= 1, (5.23)
where M > 0 is the terminal wealth of the customer and γ is the relative risk
aversion coefficient.
Reworking with CEV results of Section 5.3.2.1, we find that the risk free bond
has the highest value when γ = 5 and γ = 7 (Table 5.4). However, the DN contract
is the most attractive when γ = 3 (Table 5.4). In all cases, holding 100% in the
risky asset is least attractive because of its high volatility.
Similarly, we re-calculate the results of Section 5.3.2.2 with γ = 5, for a 20-
year-time horizon. The optimal buy-and-hold portfolio is to invest 5% in the GJN
contract, 79% in the risk-free asset and the remainder in the risky asset. The new
contract and DN contract are not in the optimal portfolio despite they having a
higher CEV than the risky asset (Table 5.4).
Figure 5.11 shows how the optimal porfolio changes against the investment
horizons under EUT. We can see that the optimal portfolio is mainly composed by
the GJN contract, the risk-free asset and the risky asset. As we have calculated
the static optimal portfolio rather than the dynamic optimal portfolio, the optimal
investment strategy is different to the well-known Merton’s solution for the dynamic
optimal portfolio. Merton (1969) shows the optimal dynamic investment strategy for
a CRRA utility function is that a constant proportion of wealth should be invested
in risky asset and risk-free asset, respectively. Our results show a relatively stable
proportion of three different assets and contracts, the GJN contract, risky-free asset
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CEV New GJN DN Risk-free asset Risky asset
γ = 3 2.2531 2.1428 2.2538 2.1911 1.7921
γ = 5 2.0558 1.7545 2.1591 2.1911 1.1401
γ = 7 1.9365 1.4771 2.0970 2.1911 0.7339
Table 5.4: Expected utility of the terminal wealth of holding the GJN contract, the new
contract, the DN contract, the risk-free asset and the risky asset under the utility function
defined by Equation (5.23). The parameters are α = 0.13. T = 20, rf = 0.04, µ = 0.065,
σ = 0.15, g = g′′ = 0.02, rp = 0.04 and P = 1.
and risky asset, in the optimal portfolio beyond 2 years time horizon. The only ex-
ception is the DN contract emerges in the optimal portfolio for short horizons(1 year
and 2 years). This is due to the special structure of DN contract. As we discussed
above, because the insurer also needs to put money in at the outset, the customer
of DN contract tend to receive a higher bonus and thus have a higher expected
return for short investment horizons. However, once the insurer go bankrupt, the
DN contract works as a risk free asset.
As the Figure 5.11 shows, GJN contract is an attractive contract under the
EUT. Especially, with the increase of the investment horizon, the proportion of the
GJN contract is increasing gradually while the proportion of risky asset is decreasing.
As the replicating portfolio of the GJN contract consists of more risky asset (less risk-
free asset) for long horizon contracts than short10, the optimal portfolio in Figure
5.11 seems to provide an approximated strategy to the Merton’s solution.
5.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine a new pension contract in the accumulation phase of a
pension scheme. This new contract occupies the characteristics of guarantees and
bonuses but has a transparent structure and clear profit distribution rule. Under
Cumulative Prospect Theory, the contract gives higher utility than the contract in-
troduced in Guille´n et al. (2006) and the contract studied by Døskeland and Nordahl
(2008b).
The result shows that shielding customers from poor stock market returns is
attractive to the customer. By the application of financial engineering techniques
10This is discussed in Guille´n et al. (2006).
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Figure 5.11: The composition of optimal portfolio for different terms using the
value function and weighting function defined in Tversky and Kahneman (1992).
rf = 0.04, µ = 0.1 and σ = 0.2.
in pricing and risk management, the insurer can manage the additional risk which
it faces in issuing such guarantees. In addition, we show that with the increase of
policyholder’s investment horizon, the proportion of the risky asset in the optimal
portfolio grows larger while the proportion of the risk-free asset decreases. This
result conforms to traditional pension investment advice that young people should
invest more money in the risky asset while old people should reduce their exposure
to risky assets.
There are much more we can investigate to continue our research. For example,
as we only find the best buy-and-hold strategy among some different sub-optimal
dynamic strategies. Hence, finding the product which matches the dynamic optimal
investment strategy is an interesting area for future research.
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Conclusion and Outlook
This thesis reviews the traditional pension contracts and propose a new pension
contracts that can be used by insurance companies to smooth investment returns
for their customers. Three research papers contained in this thesis show the reader
how to design an innovative pension contract that best meet the demand for a
CPT-maximising customers.
In order to have a deep understanding of the pension contracts, Chapter 3
carefully examines a traditional with-profits contract in the market. We start with
deriving the analytical formula for the fair pricing of this contract by assuming the
underlying fund prices following the geometric Brownian motion. Our finding in-
dicates that this contract is more valuable than its price owing to its free issued
guarantees. With the increase of the guarantee rate, the contract could be more
valuable to the customers. In addition, the smoothing method is the geometric av-
erage of 5 years return which include 2 yearly return before the term of the contract.
This special structure exposes the insurer to a risk that cannot be hedged. An an-
alytical formula for fair pricing of unhedgeable risk is obtained in this chapter as
well. Moreover, the inter-generation risk sharing has been studied for a 50 genera-
tions model. Under the assumption of the return distribution and risk sharing rule,
there is an cross-subsidization between different generations. The later generations
benefit from the return distributions from previous generations.
Smoothing is an important feature of the with-profits products. It is viewed as
a benefit to the customers as it reduces the market risk and provides the customers
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more stable investment returns. In order to understand how the smoothing work, in
Chapter 4, We compare three widely used smoothing methods of with-profits con-
tracts in UK, the geometric average (GA) method, the weighted sum (WS) method
and the Bandwidth (BW) method. The main contributions of this chapter are on
the fairness and the smoothing effects of different smoothing methods. By compar-
ing the smoothed and actual terminal value, our findings show that the GA method
provides a less payout to the customers while the BW method overpays. The WS
method generate a fair terminal payout to the customer. In addition, we are also
interested in the utility or the satisfaction from different smoothing methods to the
customers. Rather than only considering the terminal utility, we also take into ac-
count the interim utility within the investment horizons. This is implemented by
calculating the Multi-Cumulative Prospect Theory (MCPT) utility. The result is
very interesting. Even though the GA method provides least terminal value, but it
generates the highest MCPT utility among the three smoothing methods. On the
other hand, the BW method provides a higher than expected return but give the
customers less utility.
Based on the findings in previous two chapters, Chapter 5 propose a new pension
contract with the features of guarantees and smoothing. It has transparent structure
and clear distribution rule. Under Cumulative Prospect thoery (CPT), the new
contract generates higher utility than the contract introduced in Guille´n et al. (2006).
The result provides the evidence why the guarantees should be included in the
pension contract. In addition, our result shows with the increase of policyholder’s
investment horizons, the proportion of risky asset in underlying investment portfolio
also increases while the proportion of risk free asset decreases. This result conforms
to the traditional life style pension investment advice.
The dot-com bubbles and 2008 financial crisis leaded to significant change to the
life insurance and pension industry. With-profits contracts used to be the dominant
player in the market. Due to its opaqueness and complexity, it only accounts for
less than 5% market share of the new business now. The simple and transparent
unit-linked contract becomes the most popular one in the market. However, we still
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believe that some merits, such as smoothing and guarantees, of with-profits contracts
are beneficial to the customers. Thus, it is expected that making the with-profits
contract more transparent while keeping its merits are the future of new life and
pension products.
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